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THE CORRECTNESS FUNCTION OF,
APPELLATE DECISION-MAKING: JUDICIAL
OBLIGATION IN AN ERA OF
FRAGMENTATION
by David P. Leonard*
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellate courts have grave and exciting responsibilities in our
common law system of adjudication. In each case, they have a twofold
task: on the one hand, to provide guidance to lower courts, legislatures,
and future litigants concerning the boundaries of the law;' and on the
other hand, to assure that the lower courts acted correctly with regard
to the particular litigants involved in that dispute.2 In a very real sense,
then, appellate courts must be both forward-looking, as they participate
in the development of the common law,3 and attentive to the means by
which the matter at issue was handled prior to reaching the appellate
level.
In pursuit of their task of providing guidance to lower courts, leg-
islatures, and future litigants, appellate courts have developed a pattern
of decision-making that is more careful and limited than bold. The
goal of appellate judges has historically been to reach conclusions sup-
ported as much as possible by clear and agreed upon reasoning. This is
a complicated process requiring great judicial cooperation, and is made
more problematic by the fact that appellate courts are multi-judge bod-
ies staffed by people from different backgrounds and possessing differ-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. B.A.
1974, University of California, San Diego; J.D. 1977, University of California, Los Angeles.
I wish to thank Professors Helen Garfield, William Hodes, and James Torke for their assist-
ance, as well as third-year law student Philip Thompson.
I. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
2. This function has been termed the "review for correctness." P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON
APPEAL].
3. This process of legal development through judicial decision-making, of course, dif-
fers from civil law systems such as that found in France. See R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW 12-15 (3d ed. 1977).
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ent legal philosophies.4 However, until the last few decades, American
appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court, were rela-
tively successful at garnering majority support for interpretations of the
law.5 Recently, though, appellate courts have become far less able to
reach majority consensus on the rationale which supports a particular
decision, and this had led to a partial breakdown in the performance of
the guidance function. This breakdown has been the source of much
concern.
6
The other function of appellate courts, that of assuring the correct-
ness of lower court action, has received little attention. Perhaps the
function is simply taken for granted,7 or perhaps there has heretofore
been little reason to doubt that appellate courts have been adequately
performing this important task. Whatever the reason for prior lack of
attention, however, the correctness function now deserves a closer look.
This is because the general splintering of appellate decisions has appar-
ently begun to take its toll not only on appellate courts' performance of
their guidance function, but also on their proper discharge of the cor-
rectness function. The potential for a breakdown in the performance of
the correctness function is particularly great in multi-issue cases in
which a majority of the divided appellate court can agree that some
reversible error was committed in the lower court, but in which no ma-
jority can agree on the precise ground on which to reverse. If, as has
recently occurred,8 the appellate court decides to affirm because no ma-
jority agrees on the ground on which the trial court erred, a serious
question arises as to whether that court has performed its function of
4. For a model which describes the framework within which appellate judges operate,
see W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31-36 (1964).
5. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
6. Among the articles which have focused on the growing number of Supreme Court
plurality decisions are Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the
Supreme Court, 74 DUKE LJ. 59 (1974); ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: .4
History ofJudiciaDisintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959); Note, The Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756 (1980); Note, Plurality Deci-
sions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Harvard Note]; Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions 4 Study in Stare De-
cisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 99 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment]. See also Miller
& Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Needfor Piercing the Red Velour Curtain,
22 BUFFALO L. REv. 799 (1973).
7. But see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience ofAppellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 779 (1957). Still, although Wright questions whether appellate judges are any better
equipped than trial judges to serve the correctness function, he does not deny outright that
the performance of this function is at least to some degree a part of an appellate court's
work.
8. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 438 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1982); Peoples Bank & Trust C6. v.
Stock, 403 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. 1980).
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assuring correctness in the trial process. In this kind of case, it is not
lower courts, legislatures, or even future litigants who are the potential
victims of the court's splintered decision-making process; the litigants
are the victims of these decisions.
This article will address the problem of breakdown in the appel-
late function of assuring correctness. First, the two tasks of appellate
decision-making will be reviewed.9 Then, the impact of an appellate
court's failure to perform its guidance function will be compared with
the impact of its nonperformance of the correctness function.' 0 Next, it
will be argued that our concept of due process requires that an appel-
late court reverse the judgment of a trial court when a majority of the
appellate judges-for whatever reason-supports that disposition of the
case. Support for this proposition will be found not only in basic due
process theory," but also in the practice-usually silent but sometimes
explicit-of appellate courts. "2 Finally, the consequences of accepting
this theory will be examined.13
II. THE DUAL FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURTS
Even in an environment increasingly dominated by legislation, 4
our system is still controlled by common law. Courts are the primary
interpreters of the limits of the law, and are the final arbiters of the
rights of individuals under the federal and state constitutions. But
courts are themselves hierarchically structured, and their functions at
the various levels differ.
Trial courts are at the front lines of fact-finding.' 5 Their task is to
determine the facts, and apply those facts to existing legal principles.
Their ability to observe first-hand the demeanor of witnesses makes the
trial courts especially suited for this role. Trial courts, therefore, do not
exist for the purpose of making law; rather, their primary function is
most often to apply established rules to the myriad factual situations
which are brought before them.' 6 In performing this function, trial
9. See infra notes 14-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 53-143 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 145-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 187-236 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.
14. See G. CALABP.EsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
15. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts ofAppeals,
3 GA. L. REv. 507, 517 (1969).
16. This does not mean, of course, that trial courts are not engaged in interpreting the
law. On the contrary, every factual pattern differs from every other to a degree which makes
it necessary for trial judges to constantly determine the scope and reach of the principles laid
down in prior appellate cases.
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
courts are seeing that justice is being done among the parties. In crimi-
nal matters, this includes assuring that the constitutional rights of the
defendant are protected. Trial courts, therefore, are the primary doers
of justice, and the first line of defense of the parties' constitutional
rights.
The functions of appellate courts differ. They have two funda-
mental tasks. First, they must set forth principles of law to guide the
lower courts, legislatures, and individuals. 17 For purposes of simplic-
ity, this role will be called the "guidance" function. 8 It has been the
subject of a great deal of attention, particularly when commentators
have believed that courts have ceased to perform the function to the
degree thought necessary. 9 The second function of appellate courts is
one of assuring correctness--to determine, by whatever test is applica-
ble to that particular kind of case,20 that the trial court correctly de-
cided the questions which were presented in the case. For simplicity,
this role will be referred to as the "correctness" function of appellate
courts.2 '
The guidance function is obviously very important, and it is un-
derstandable that commentators would pay closer attention to it. Since
the structure of American court systems places trial courts at the front
lines of fact-finding, too much appellate review of the correctness of
trial court action might signal an unwarranted appellate invasion upon
the primary fact-finding function of the trial courts.2 2 Greater atten-
tion would therefore naturally be paid to the appellate court's role of
formulating standards which trial courts can apply to individual cases.
That formulation process is a delicate and complex one, involving a
"varied mix of value judgments about conflicting social policies and
procedural practices .... 23 By expending their energies on a careful
evaluation of all of these factors, appellate judges will produce consis-
17. Referring to the functions of the Supreme Court, see Davis & Reynolds, supra note
6, at 61; Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1128.
18. This function has also been called "institutional review." JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra
note 2, at 2-3.
19. See supra note 6.
20. The precise test to be applied depends on the jurisdiction and on the kind of case
being reviewed. In California, the appellate court will review trial court actions in criminal
cases to determine whether the trial court committed error which "affected the substantial
rights of the defendant." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1259 (West 1982).
21. See supra note 2. The function might also be termed a "justice" function, though
that term is perhaps more suited to criminal cases. Therefore, the term "correctness" will be
used here.
22. See Wright, supra note 7, at 781-82.
23. Carrington, supra note 15, at 518.
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tent rules which help to assure both fairness and uniformity in the law's
application to individual cases. This guidance function is perhaps
more important in courts of last resort than in intermediate appellate
courts.
2 4
If the sole function of appellate courts were that of guidance, one
would expect that rules would often permit them to render advisory
opinions. This, however, is seldom true. The Constitution requires
that a case or controversy exist before the federal courts can assert ju-
risdiction,25 and the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Court
cannot render advisory opinions.26 On the state level, moreover, a pro-
vision allowing state courts to issue advisory opinions is quite unu-
sual.27 Appellate courts must serve a function directly related to the
particular controversy and parties involved in the cases before them.
That function is assuring correctness. The precise degree to which ap-
pellate courts should scrutinize the efforts of trial courts has been the
source of some controversy,2" but there is no doubt that to some extent,
24. Ultimately, the highest court of a state must serve, within its own jurisdiction, a role
analogous to that of the United States Supreme Court. It must guide not only the trial
courts, but also the intermediate appellate courts, often resolving differences among those
intermediate courts.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26. The Court once stated:
[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be ren-
dered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.
Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), in which Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, wrote that the power of federal courts "has no substance,
without reference to the necessity 'to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controver-
sies."' (citing Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). Id. at
471. He went on to say that the requirement of an actual injury suffered by a party "tends to
assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Id. at 472.
27. Some state constitutions do provide for the issuance of advisory opinions. See, e.g.,
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MAss. CONST. Pt. 2, ch. 3, Art. II; N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, Art. 74.
However, courts tend to strictly construe their authority under these provisions. See In re
House Resolution No. 12, 88 Colo. 569, 298 P. 960 (1931). The Massachusetts high court
once wrote that advisory opinions "given by the justice as individuals in their capacity as
constitutional advisers of the other departments of government and without the aid of argu-
ments, are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare deci-
sis." Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (1931).
28. Leon Green was dismayed at the practice of appellate courts of "draw[ing] unto
themselves practically all the power of the judicial system." L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY
280 (1930). Writing a quarter of a century later, Charles Alan Wright bitterly complained of
this practice, which he characterized as "the transmutation of specific circumstances into
questions of law." Wright, supra note 7, at 751. Carrington, however, disagreed with
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appellate courts "serve as the instrument of accountability of those who
make the basic decisions in trial courts. ... 29 While they can seldom
effectively or appropriately sit as second or third triers of fact, they
must nevertheless subject the trial court's fact-finding process to partic-
ular tests of correctness laid out by prior practice and, often, by rule.30
Even though the standards by which trial court judgments are tested
are quite deferential to the processes of the trial courts, 3' appellate
courts would not be doing their full jobs if they did not use their power
to exercise this review function.
Even the United States Supreme Court, whose primary function is
often thought to be that of guidance, exercises a correctness function:
[O]nce the Court does decide that a case fits its criteria for
certiorari or appeal and takes that case, the Justices have an
obligation not merely to lay down wise policy to cover all sim-
ilar situations, but also to guard, to the extent they are able,
the rights of the litigants. Protection of the legal rights of liti-
gants is not the only concern of the Court, but it must be a
major concern as long as this institution functions as a court
of law as well as a policy-making branch of the national gov-
ernment and not solely in the latter capacity.32
These are strong terms, and they suggest that assuring correctness is
more than a mere technical matter. It involves a crucial judgment
about whether the trial court has properly protected the rights of the
Wright's analysis, and responded with his own article some years later. Carrington, supra
note 15.
29. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 2, at 2.
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. Outside of the particular procedural setting of a case, it is not possible to speak of a
standard which an appellate court will use to review the actions of a trial court. However,
with respect to those decisions of a trial court which rest in its own discretion (and this
encompasses a vast number of trial court actions), it has been noted that "the appellate court
will supersede only when it is satisfied that the trial judge was clearly wrong." F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 680 (2d ed., 1977) (footnote omitted). Moreover, even if a
trial court has erred in some respect, the appellate court will not reverse unless it."concludes
that [the error] materially affected the outcome or involved an important issue of procedural
justice." Id (This is the so-called "prejudicial error" rule.) See also FED. R. EvID. 103(a)
("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected . ") These standards show much deference to the
trial court.
Of course, in certain situations, an appellate court will more closely scrutinize a trial
court's actions. As to situations in which an appellate court finds error of constitutional
proportion, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the court must reverse unless it is
"able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also note 20 supra.
32. W. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 187-88 (1964).
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parties, and as such, the correctness function assumes constitutional di-
mension. This point will be more fully explored later.
33
An example of the Supreme Court's exercise of its correctness
function is Bridges v. Wixon.34 Harry Bridges was a resident alien who
became active in the trade union movement during the 1930's while
working as a longshoreman in San Francisco. His activities were de-
spised by many in Congress and in the Executive, and efforts were un-
dertaken to deport him. In 1938 a deportation proceeding was
initiated, but federal law then in effect would not have permitted de-
portation on the grounds asserted, and the hearing examiner dismissed
-the proceedings. Congress reacted within a few months by amending
the statute with the explicit purpose of assuring the deportation of
Bridges.35 A new deportation proceeding was instituted, and the Attor-
ney General eventually ordered Bridges deported. Bridges then
brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and following decisions in
the district court 36 and the court of appeals37 denying the petition, the
matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari.
It became clear during the Supreme Court's deliberation on the
case that a majority favored reversal, but there was much disagreement
as to the precise grounds.3 At least one Justice doubted the constitu-
tionality of the statute.39 Others favored reversal on grounds not re-
lated to the constitutionality of the statute itself. Finally, one Justice
warned of the possible implications of a decision in favor of Bridges.
He feared that if the Court's decision posed a constitutional limit on
Congress' power to expel aliens, Congress might react by further limit-
33. See infra notes 145-86 and accompanying text.
34. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
35. One Congressman, discussing the bill before the House of Representatives, declared:
"It is my joy to announce that this bill... changes the law so that the Department of
Justice should now have little trouble in deporting Harry Bridges and all others of similar
ilk." 86 CONG. REc. 9031 (1940). The new statute was enacted in 1940. 54 Stat. 673, 8
U.S.C. § 137. It has since been repealed, and is partly covered elsewhere in the Code. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of Bridges and the Congres-
sional activity, see W. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 189-92.
36. Ex parte Bridges, 49 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
37. Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1944).
38. W. MURPHY, supra note 4, at 190, citing to Justice Murphy's notes of the conference.
Box 6, Bridges v. Wixon file, Frank Murphy Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Ann
Arbor, Mich.
39. One Justice believed the act was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. W. MUR-
PHY, supra note 4, at 190.
1984]
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ing or even cutting off immigration.4° This, of course, would hurt
others in the future. This fear apparently took hold, and Justice Doug-
las' majority opinion reversing the lower courts was not based on con-
stitutional grounds. Rather, he held that the lower courts had
construed the terms of the statute too broadly,41 and that the admission
of certain unsworn statements was prejudicial error.4 2
By disposing of the case without declaring the deportation statute
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court exhibited a strong recognition of
both its general policy-making function and its correctness function.
With regard to the former, the Court acted in a manner calculated to
assure that what is believed to be an unwise development-congres-
sional restriction of future immigration-would not occur. Also,
through its majority opinion and a concurring opinion by Justice Mur-
phy, the Court offered guidance to lower courts and administrative offi-
cials by implicitly criticizing the manner in which Bridges' case had
been handled.43 At the same time, the Court performed its correctness
function by derailing the deportation proceedings against Bridges. The
Court had acted with an eye to both functions.4"
Of course, other considerations might well have been involved in
the Court's determination of how to dispose of Bridges. But there can
be no doubt that the Court's strong language in cases dealing with the
case or controversy requirement evidences its position that it is the ac-
tual case before it, and not other considerations such as future gui-
dance, which most govern the Court's actions.45 If the Court perceived
its role differently, it could certainly have rendered an interpretation of
the case or controversy requirement that permitted it to hear more
cases purely in order to clarify the law and thus provide more
guidance.
40. Id Congress has broad powers in the area of naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4.
41. 326 U.S. at 141-49.
42. Id at 150-56.
43. Justice Murphy wrote: "Seldom if ever in the history of this nation has there been
such a concentrated and relentless crusade to deport an individual because he dared to exer-
cise the freedom that belongs to him as a human being and that is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution." Id at 157 (Murphy, J., concurring).
44. Because of the secrecy of Supreme Court deliberations, it is not often that the public
can learn the underlying basis of the Court's actions. Nevertheless, there are times when
Justices will specifically indicate that they are compromising. See infra notes 206-34 and
accompanying text. And the popular literature contains at least one detailed attempt to get
behind the scenes of Supreme Court deliberations. R. WooDwARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979).
45. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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The last few decades have witnessed increasing awareness of the
correctness function by intermediate federal courts and state appellate
courts. This trend can perhaps be seen most clearly in the increasingly
broad appellate review of such questions as the size of verdicts and
whether the verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.46
Although some scholars, including Charles Alan Wright, have
bemoaned this development as an unwarranted intrusion into the func-
tions of trial court and jury,47 even these critics of broad appellate re-
view have difficulty entirely dismissing the correctness function of
appellate courts.48 Moreover, the instances of broadened appellate re-
view of which Wright complained seem to fall largely into the category
of disturbing trial court findings of fact which, given the argument that
trial courts are generally in a better position to determine and weigh
facts, is a fairly easy target.49 Not all exercises of an appellate court's
correctness function, however, amount to overturning findings of fact.
When the Supreme Court invalidated the deportation proceedings
brought against Harry Bridges, it did so without second-guessing the
fact finders. The Supreme Court truly was, in that case, Harry Bridges'
last line of defense against capricious governmental action.
Appellate courts, then, must serve a correctness function, and per-
formance of that function inures most directly to the benefit of the liti-
gants in the particular case being reviewed. But assuring review of the
actions of trial courts also has an indirect benefit to society in general:
it helps to build public confidence in the institutions of government
including, of course, the courts themselves.50 Charles Alan Wright
himself said, quoting Blackstone: "'[N]ext to doing right, the great ob-
ject in the administration of public justice should be to give public sat-
isfaction.' ' '51 Wright believed that the particular assertion of
broadened review power to which he addressed his article would lead
46. Wright, supra note 7, at 752-63.
47. Id.
48. Wright ultimately rested his attack on broadened appellate review on the concern
that this development would not lead to greater justice. I -at 779-82.
49. In fairness, Wright does not base his argument solely on the trial court's superior
ability to judge the demeanor of witnesses. He also attacks broad appellate review of factual
determinations based on documentary evidence. d at 764-71. There, trial courts may not
have any special advantage over appellate courts. Still, Wright's main point amounts to
concern about whether the appellate court is better able than a trial court to assure that
justice is done. Although he is not convinced of this even as to documentary evidence mat-
ters, his argument in that kind of case is weaker than it is with respect to issues which
depend upon the credibility of witnesses.
50. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 2, at 3; Carrington, supra note 15, at 519.
51. Wright, supra note 7, at 780 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *391).
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to less public satisfaction. At the same time it is hard to doubt that, in
general, public confidence in government will be improved by appel-
late decisions which correct miscarriages of justice.
Thus, though there may not be an inherent constitutional right to
appellate review of trial court actions,52 it is clear that once provision
for such review is made, it must be undertaken with attention to both
the guidance and the correctness functions of the court. Perhaps the
most effective way to demonstrate the vital nature of both functions of
appellate review is to consider the consequences, both to the litigants in
particular cases and institutionally, of a failure to serve those functions.
III. BREAKDOWN IN PERFORMANCE OF APPELLATE COURTS'
FUNCTIONS
A. The Guidance Function
Appellate courts best perform their function of clarifying the law
when they are able to garner majority support in each case not only for
the disposition, but also for the reasoning which supports that result.
This does not mean, of course, that appellate courts should always
speak with one voice. 3 It does mean, however, that if they are to truly
guide the lower courts, and help individuals and legislators to under-
stand the demands of the law, appellate courts must work to prevent
.serious splintering of opinions.
The American practice of writing majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions in appellate cases differs sharply from the English
practice of issuing seriatim opinions whereby, particularly in the court
of appeals, each justice traditionally gives his view of the case.54 This is
usually done orally, immediately after oral argument, and therefore
without much collective deliberation by the justices.55 While it is not
uncommon for a particular justice to state simply that he concurs with
the views of the preceding justices, 5 6 the very practice of rendering oral
opinions without significant collective deliberation increases the possi-
52. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
53. On the contrary, American courts have developed a strong tradition of tolerating
dissent among their members. See infra note 99. This was despite Chief Justice Marshall's
view that in each case, there should be but one opinion of the Court. See infra notes 57-68
and accompanying text.
54. D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 98 (1963).
55. Id See also Lawson, Comparative Judicial Style, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 364, 365
(1977).
56. D. KARLEN, supra note 54, at 98; Lawson, supra note 55, at 365.
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bility that justices will state divergent rationales, and that no clear rea-
soning will emerge from the court's consideration of the case.
When John Marshall became Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court in 1801, he inherited a system of deciding cases derived
chiefly from the English practice.5 1 Marshall, however, believed that
the Supreme Court should play an important role in the federal sys-
tem." At the time he assumed his place on the Court, though, the
Court was viewed with distrust by some politicians, and indifference by
the general public.59 In his years on the Court, Marshall not only as-
sured the enduring power of the Court through substantive decisions,
60
but he also began a practice of issuing opinions for the entire Court.6 I
His hope was to achieve an appearance of harmony and unity, and this
hope seems to have been realized since, by 1819, the Court "stood at a
pinnacle of public veneration." 62 Although Thomas Jefferson vigor-
ously opposed this new practice, characterizing it as "convenient for the
lazy, the modest and the incompetent," 63 Marshall's practice set a tone
for Supreme Court decision-making which still has its vestiges today,
and which serves as the model for multi-judge courts in all American
jurisdictions. 64
57. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 117 (1973); D. MORGAN, JUSTICE
WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 168-69 (1954).
58. D. MORGAN, srupra note 57, at 173.
59. Id at 173-74. When the federal government moved to its new site at Washington,
D.C. in 1800, no arrangement had even been made for a building to house the Supreme
Court. For its sessions from 1801-08, the Court was assigned a "small and undignified
chamber" in the Capitol. I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
168-71 (1937).
60. The late Chief Justice Earl Warren once wrote: "[P]erhaps the greatest contribution
he made to our system of jurisprudence was the establishment of an independent judiciary
through the principle ofjudicial review." Warren, Foreword to CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MAR-
SHALL: A REAPPRAISAL at xv. (W.M. Jones, ed. 1956). John Marshall's life and contribu-
tions to the law have been carefully chronicled. See, e.g., A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL (1916); L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974).
61. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 117.
62. D. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 175-76.
63. Jefferson wrote:
The judges holding their offices for life are under two responsibilities only.
1. Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. But this practice compleatly withdraws
them from both. For nobody knows what opinion any individual member gave in
any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself...
The practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest & the incompetent.
Letter to Justice William Johnson, Oct. 27, 1822, cited in D. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 169.
Jefferson was probably correct to a great degree. The practice instituted by Marshall was
one of stifling dissent, and thus achieving a sort of artificial unanimity which presented the
appearance, rather than the reality, of unity. D. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 175-76.
64. The practice of issuing opinions of the court also grew in some state courts in the
early 19th century. James Kent, for example, developed a practice of issuing per curiam
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It may have been Marshall's hope that in each case the Court
would issue only a single opinion, but it was not long before voices of
dissent came to be heard. Justice William Johnson, who has been
called the "first dissenter,"6 5 found it necessary as early as 1809 to sub-
mit a separate opinion laying out his own reasoning and stating that he
was doing so in order that he not be associated with an "ambiguous
decision."66 Marshall himself was to write a dissenting opinion one
year later,67 and a number of others during his tenure on the Court.68
Despite the emergence of dissent, the Supreme Court continued in
almost every case to render decisions subscribed by a majority of the
Justices. From the time Marshall instituted his practice of rendering a
single opinion until 1955, there were only forty-five cases in which the
Court could not muster a clear majority for its reasoning. 69 Thus, al-
though Marshall may not have succeeded in creating an atmosphere in
which the Court would always speak with one voice, it was clear that
the precedent set by his decision-making process had a lasting impact
on the Court. Obtaining a majority in each case is at least the goal of
the Court, and this undoubtedly leads to lengthy deliberations in many
cases in an effort to achieve this objective.70
Until the middle of this century, the divergence from English prac-
tice was sharp and constant. At that point, however, a serious break-
down of the tradition established by Marshall began to appear in the
Court's process. From 1955 until the end of Earl Warren's tenure,
there were forty-two additional plurality decisions.71 And from the be-
opinions on the New York high court, and noted that in one term, all the opinions were per
curiam. W. KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETrERS OF JAMES KENT 118 (1898), cited in L. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 57, at 118.
65. This, of course, was part of the title of Morgan's biography of Justice Johnson, supra
note 57.
66. Marine Insurance Co. v. Young, 9 U.S. 105, 107, 5 Cranch 187, 191 (1809).
67. Hudson and Smith v. Guestier, 10 U.S. 161, 164, 6 Cranch 281, 286 (1810). Interest-
ingly, Marshall's dissent in this case was necessitated by his misreading of the majority's
sentiments in Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. 143, 4 Cranch 241 (1808). While Marshall believed his
opinion in that case was supported by a majority, it was not. Hudson and Smith overruled
Rose, and Marshall found it necessary to dissent. See D. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 176-77.
68. D. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 306-07 (app. II). Morgan notes six Marshall dissents
up to 1833. Marshall's tenure on the Court ended in 1835.
69. Chicago Comment, supra note 6, at 99 n.4. Cases in which no majority joins in an
opinion are usually referred to as "plurality" decisions.
70. Referring to the Supreme Court's lengthy deliberations over its decision in Brown v.
Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see Davis & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 63-64. See
generally R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 44. Some form of bargaining may
also occur in an effort to reach consensus in a given case. See W. MURPHY, supra note 4, at
56-68.
71. Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1127 n.1.
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ginning of the Burger Court until 1981, there were approximately
eighty-eight plurality decisions.72 There is, moreover, no sign of a
slow-down in the plurality decision-making in the Supreme Court,73 or
in state courts.74
When appellate courts are unable to render majority opinions,
their guidance and clarification functions suffer. Unaided by majority
reasoning supporting the prior decisions of a higher court, litigants and
lower court judges are unable to discern the limits of the enunciated
rules. Legislatures are similarly disadvantaged as they are unable to
determine whether pending legislation will withstand attacks brought
through the courts. As already indicated, a number of commentators
have expressed great concern about the increasing inability of the
United States Supreme Court to render majority decisions on impor-
tant social issues.75 Two illustrations should suffice to clarify the kind
of problem created by a court's failure to reach majority reasoning to
support its result. Although the examples draw from the United States
Supreme Court, the point is equally applicable to state appellate courts,
particularly those of last resort.
In 1949, the Supreme Court decided National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Co.76 A District of Columbia corporation filed an
action against a Virginia corporation in the federal district court for
Maryland. Jurisdiction was founded upon a 1940 federal statute pro-
viding for diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts for civil actions not
involving federal questions brought between citizens of the District of
Columbia and citizens of a state.77 Defendant challenged the constitu-
tionality of this diversity statute, claiming that it contravened the diver-
sity requirements of the Constitution as to federal jurisdiction. The
district court agreed, and dismissed the action. A divided court of ap-
peals affirmed. In the Supreme Court, there were four opinions. Jus-
tice Jackson wrote the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,
but was joined only by Justices Black and Burton. Justices Rutledge
and Murphy concurred, while Justices Vincent and Douglas joined in
72. Id.
73. Among the recent Supreme Court plurality decisions are Barclay v. Florida, 103 S.
Ct. 3418 (1983); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535
(1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
74. In the California Supreme Court, for example, at least 20 plurality decisions were
found in criminal cases alone for the ten-year period 1973 to 1983. For a description of the
search method employed, see infra note 203 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 6.
76. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
77. 54 Stat. 143 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)).
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one dissent, and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, dissented
separately. In his opinion upholding the constitutionality of the federal
statute, Justice Jackson stated that the District of Columbia was not a
state for diversity purposes under Article III of the Constitution.
78
However, although the statute could not therefore be upheld under Ar-
ticle III, Jackson stated that Congress has power under Article I to leg-
islate for the District of Columbia, and could confer jurisdiction upon
Article III courts in order to provide a forum for citizens of the District
of Columbia. 9 Three Justices had therefore upheld the constitutional-
ity of the statute under Article I of the Constitution.
As already indicated, Justices Rutledge and Murphy concurred in
the judgment of the Court. However, they expressly rejected the rea-
soning set forth by Justice Jackson. They believed that jurisdiction
could be conferred under Article III by overruling Chief Justice Mar-
shall's decision in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey,80 and declaring the Dis-
trict of Columbia a state for purposes of Article III."1 Therefore, two
Justices concurred in the result, but expressly rejected the rationale set
forth by Justice Jackson.
If the votes of these five members of the Supreme Court are to-
talled, the result is that a five-member majority upheld the constitution-
ality of the federal diversity statute as it relates to actions brought by
citizens of the District of Columbia against citizens of a state. Each of
the decisions, however, expressly rejected the reasoning of the other.
The four dissenters, of course, rejected both the concept that jurisdic-
tion could be founded on Article I and that jurisdiction could be
founded on Article III. This leads to an anomolous result, as noted by
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent:
A substantial majority of the Court agrees that each of the
two grounds urged in support of the attempt by Congress to
extend diversity jurisdiction to cases involving citizens of the
District of Columbia must be rejected-but not the same ma-
jority. And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to
pass a result-paradoxical as it may appear-which differing
majorities of the Court find insupportable.82
78. 337 U.S. at 588 (Jackson, J., joined by Black and Burton, JJ.).
79. Id. at 600 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring).
80. 6 U.S. 265, 2 Cranch 445 (1805).
81. 337 U.S. 617-26 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A brief case note published shortly after
Tidewater was handed down called the various opinions a "rather startling set." Note, 35
CORNELL L. Rv. 198, 200 (1949).
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The problem created by Tidewater is that the Court, by its inability
to reach majority reasoning, has not provided significant guidance con-
cerning the contours of the law. After Tidewater, for example, the
lower courts, future litigants, and Congress only knew that Congress
had the power to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear non-
federal question actions between citizens of the District of Columbia
and those of a state. No guidance was provided as to the source of this
power or its limits. Lower court decisions rendered after Tidewater il-
lustrate the difficulty of applying that case. In Siegmund v. General
Commodities Corp. ,83 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced
the question of whether Congress had the power to confer jurisdiction
upon the federal courts to hear actions between citizens of the Territory
of Hawaii and those of a state. The court held that under Tidewater,
Congress did have the power to confer such jurisdiction upon the fed-
eral courts.84 However, given the lack of majority reasoning in Tidewa-
ter, this conclusion was not self-evident. The court admitted, for
example, that Article I does not expressly provide for Congressional
power over the territories as it does for power over the District of
Columbia.85 Nevertheless, quoting from both of the Supreme Court
opinions in Tidewater which asserted the constitutionality of the juris-
dictional statute, the Circuit Court determined that jurisdiction could
be conferred in the case before it.
Another interesting illustration of the uncertainty created by the
lack of majority reasoning in Tidewater is provided by Greene v. Tef-
feteller 16 There, the citizenship of the parties was precisely analogous
to that of the parties in Tidewater, with the plaintiffs being citizens of
the District of Columbia, and defendants being citizens of a state. De-
spite the disposition of Tidewater which had the effect of upholding the
constitutionality of Congress' grant of jurisdiction in this situation, de-
fendants still moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the
lack of majority reasoning in Tidewater left the basic question open.
The district court noted the fact that each group of Justices comprising
the Tidewater majority expressly rejected the other group's rationale,
but nevertheless held that "precedent is established by the votes of the
justices, not by the reasons given for their votes."87 It therefore denied
defendant's motion to dismiss.
83. 175 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949).
84. Id. at 954.
85. Id.
86. 90 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
87. Id. at 388.
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Even given the difficulties faced by lower courts in the wake of
Tidewater,88 the guidance problems created by the specific context of
that case are not too great. The issue was reasonably narrow and, once
the Court had resolved it (even without majority reasoning), there were
few questions left for future application. Thus, although Tidewater
does exemplify the basic problem created by a high court's inability to
reach majority consensus on reasoning, it does not effectively demon-
strate the chaos which can truly result when a court is faced with enun-
ciating a test that lower courts must thereafter apply to myriad factual
situations. That kind of problem is better exemplified by the Supreme
Court's tortured progress in dealing with obscenity cases in the period
preceding 1973.
In 1957, a majority of the Court stated that obscenity is not consti-
tutionally protected speech.89 However, the Warren Court was never
able to develop a lasting test to be applied to determine what consti-
tutes obscenity.90 The various Justices continued to hold different
views of the appropriate test.91 After many failed attempts, the Court
finally resorted to the practice of summarily reversing convictions for
disseminating materials that according to the various tests which a ma-
jority of the Justices would have applied, were protected by the Consti-
tution.92 It was not until 1973 when the Burger Court decided Miller v.
California93 that a single test for obscenity was agreed upon by a ma-
jority.94 Even that test, however, has required some clarification.9"
88. For other decisions which illustrate the difficulty of applying the Tidewater decision,
see Chicago Comment, supra note 6, at 109.
89. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
90. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 64-66, 69-70.
91. For example, Justices Black and Douglas believed the first amendment fully pro-
tected obscenity. Id. at 69-70. Justice Brennan believed the first amendment would permit
banning of" 'hard core pornography,' sales to the young, and 'pandering.'" Id. at 70. Jus-
tice Harlan believed that the states should be given much discretion in the matter. Id.
92. Id. at 70 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973)). See also Redrup v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), a per curiam decision which noted the divergent views of
the Justices as to the proper test, and then concluded: "Whichever of these constitutional
views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand.
Accordingly, the judgment in each case is reversed." 386 U.S. at 771. See also F. SCHAUER,
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 44 (1976), noting that between 1967 and 1973, the Court decided 31
obscenity cases by summarily reversing convictions.
93. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
94. The majority stated a three-pronged test:
(a) whether, "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ....
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,
Id. at 24.
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As long as the Court had not provided guidance to local and state
legislatures as to the kind of speech protected by the Constitution, it
was not performing its function of informing them of the limits of their
Constitutional powers. Also, the Court's failure to develop a majority-
supported test for determining what constitutes obscenity left lower
courts unable to make initial determinations of the constitutionality of
challenged legislation. Even accepting the difficulty of applying the
test eventually enunciated in Miller v. California,96 at least the Court
had finally provided some standards by which state legislatures could
act, lower courts could judge challenged material, and individuals
could measure their own conduct.
97
The problems created by a court's inability to agree on reasoning
in cases involving important social issues are therefore serious, and the
solutions are not immediately apparent.98 Surely, it would not be ap-
propriate to stifle dissent on high courts, 99 nor could it be expected that
such attempts would meet with any success. In an increasingly com-
plex society in which the courts have assumed an active role as agents
95. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The Court in Hamling held
that the Constitution does not mandate the substitution of state or local standards for a
nationwide standard. 418 U.S. at 103-10. See also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
96. See supra notes 94-95. The Miller test itself used undefined, vague terms to which
only experience will give fuller meaning. Interestingly, one study concluded that after
Miller, "neither the total number of obscenity prosecutions nor the nationwide conviction
rate in cases actually brought has substantially changed. . . ." Project, An Empirical In-
quiry Into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
810, 928 (1977). The study noted that while Miller broadened the scope of regulable matter,
the number of jurisdictions prosecuting obscenity had actually declined, despite the availa-
bility of increasingly explicit materials. Id. at 928.
97. The Supreme Court's struggle with the death penalty provides another example of
its inability to derive a test which was clear enough to serve its guidance function, particu-
larly as to the constitutional limits of state power. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), for example, there were no fewer than ten opinions (one by each Justice plus one per
curiam), and the question of the per se constitutionality of the death penalty remained un-
resolved. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) held that the death penalty was not per se
unconstitutional, but the decision holding the Georgia statute constitutional was based at
least in part on the particular procedural safeguards built into the statute. The precise na-
ture of the safeguards required in order for a statute to pass constitutional muster, and of the
crimes for which the death penalty can be inflicted, remains somewhat unsettled.
98. Some suggestions, such as for a reduced caseload for the Supreme Court and more
attempts to reach "highest common denominator" reasoning, have been made. See, e.g.,
Davis & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 81-82.
99. On the contrary, a number of commentators have noted the importance of the right
to dissent. William 0. Douglas once wrote that "[tihe right to dissent is the only thing that
makes life tolerable for a judge of an appellate court." W.O. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHAL-
LENGED 14 (1960). See also Rehnquist, 'Wll Discord, Harmony Not Understood" The Per-
formance of the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 Aniz. L. REv. 973 (1980); Fuld, The
Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1962).
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for change and control, it is to be expected that judges will differ and
that they will feel compelled to set out their views in separate opinions.
The more far-reaching a judge believes a particular case to be, the
greater will be the desire to set out any disagreements in detail, often in
the hope of offering some limitations on the scope of that decision. Ap-
pellate judges are therefore constantly faced with difficult decisions re-
garding when it is important enough to set out their views separately,
and when, on the other hand, they should suppress this desire in order
to better serve the guidance function of an appellate tribunal.
Although in Tidewater and in the obscenity cases, the Supreme
Court did not fully serve its guidance function because it could not
muster a majority rationale for disposition of the cases, one thing is
clear about the results of those cases: in each case the Court disposed
of the case consistently with the wishes of the majority. In Tidewater,
for example, a majority wished to permit the plaintiff to go forward in
the forum of its choice, and this was the disposition of the case. In the
obscenity cases prior to 1973, the inability of the Court to reach major-
ity consensus on the reasoning to support the majority's view that the
prosecution could not go forward did not prevent the Court from over-
turning those convictions.
Suppose, however, that in Redrup v. New York,' °° in which the
Court summarily reversed convictions for selling allegedly obscene
books and magazines, the Court had instead determined that its inabil-
ity to reach majority consensus as to the test to be applied made it
necessary to affirm the convictions. Or suppose that an appellant raises
a series of separate issues each of which allegedly necessitates reversal,
and although a majority of the appellate judges agree that some revers-
ible error was committed, they affirm because they cannot agree as to
which ground constituted the error. In neither case would the decision
to affirm have an effect on the degree to which the appellate court per-
forms its guidance function. 01 But what about the correctness func-
tion? Arguably, a decision to affirm in the face of majority support for
100. 386 U.S. 767 (1967). See supra note 92.
101. Note that in Redrup, because the majority held that the materials could not constitu-
tionally be found obscene, no new trial was ordered. If, however, the Court had rendered a
decision which necessitated the holding of a new trial, it would not have provided sufficient
guidance to the lower court as to the standard to be applied to the allegedly obscene materi-
als. In that sense, a decision to reverse andremand would have created a situation in which
the Court would have served its guidance function even less effectively than in the actual
case. The problems of a remand when an appellate court's divided justices cannot provide
such guidance to the lower court will be considered later. See infra notes 243-52 and accom-
panying text.
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reversal would, in both cases, represent a serious breakdown in the
court's service of this second, and vital, function of appellate review.
For reasons which are not entirely clear, the Supreme Court has never
rendered a disposition which is contrary to the majority vote of the
Justices.102 But there are certain kinds of cases routinely faced by all
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, in which there is great
potential for the emergence of this breakdown should the court find
itself seriously divided on the issues."1 Two recent decisions of a state
court indeed represent examples of cases in which a majority favored
reversal, but because no majority existed on the particular ground on
which to reverse, the court afftrmed.0 4 The article will now turn to an
analysis of the problems created by a court's decision to affirm under
such circumstances.
B. The Correctness Function
On May 7, 1980, Martin Bryan abducted a clerk at a convenience
store, drove with her in her car, and raped her repeatedly. He then
made the victim get into the trunk of the car, and cut her throat. The
woman, however, possessed enormous presence of mind and pretended
that she had passed out, and finally, that she was dead. Believing she
was dead, Bryan drove around for a while, and eventually abandoned
the car. The victim managed to free herself from the trunk of the car,
and escaped.105 Bryan was later convicted in an Indiana state court of
attempted murder, rape, and confinement, and sentenced to concurrent
terms of 45, 20, and 4 years."
On direct appeal to the state supreme court, Bryan raised five er-
rors: (1) that the trial court failed to follow a statutory procedure in
determining his competency to stand trial; (2) that the trial court
abused its discretion in overruling his pre-trial motions for continu-
ances; (3) that his Miranda rights had been violated in the taking of his
statement; (4) that the jury selection process was not in compliance
with statute; and (5) that his sentence was manifestly unreasonable.10 7
102. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. This is not to say that the Justices have
not at times compromised their views about the disposition of the case. Indeed, there are
some notable examples of explicit compromise. See infra notes 206-34 and accompanying
text.
103. See infra notes 187-202 and accompanying text.
104. Bryan v. State, 438 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1982); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock, 403
N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. 1980).
105. Bryan v. State, 438 N.E.2d at 711-12.
106. Id. at 711.
107. Id.
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The first opinion in the state supreme court was subscribed by only
two of the five justices. These justices reviewed and rejected each
ground asserted by Bryan. l08 Two other justices wrote an opinion
characterized as a dissent in which they agreed with the prior justices'
resolution of all issues except the question of the admissibility of de-
fendant's statement. As to that ground, these justices believed that re-
versible error had been committed. They would have remanded the
case for a new trial to be conducted without introducing defendant's
statement."° The final justice wrote an opinion, also characterized as a
dissent, in which he agreed with the first opinion's resolution of all is-
sues except that involving the determination of defendant's competency
to stand trial. As to that ground, the final justice would have held that
the case should be remanded and a new determination of defendant's
competency made.110
Thus, only two of the five justices believed that the conviction
should be affirmed. The remaining three justices, splitting two to one
as to the precise ground, believed that reversible error had occurred at
the trial. Despite this apparent three to two vote for reversal, the court,
without discussing the propriety of doing so, affirmed. In an interview
with the press, Chief Justice Givan, one of the two justices who voted
to affirm, stated that it was "very unusual" to reach such a disposition,
but that "itis in keeping with the system.""' He went on to say: "The
majority is saying [defendant] has a right to a new trial, but you have to
take one point at a time and you have to have a majority on every one.
There were no more than two voting for any one reason."' 1 2
Chief Justice Givan's comments suggest that he believes the result
reached by the court was required by the workings of the judicial sys-
tem. Specifically, the view is that unless a majority of the justices can
agree as to aparticular error, the actions of the trial court must be af-
firmed.' 1 3 This is despite the belief of a majority of the justices that
some reversible error was committed by the trial court. Nevertheless,
there is surface appeal to the justice's view, as can be demonstrated by
considering what might happen in Bryan were the court to reverse the
conviction.
108. Id. at 711-19 (opinion of Pivarnik, J., joined by Givan, C.J.).
109. Id. at 719-22 (opinion of DeBruler, J., joined by Hunter, J.).
110. Id. at 722 (opinion of Prentice, J.).
11. Defendant Loses Despite Court's Majority Rule, Indianapolis Star, Aug. 12, 1982, at
17, col 1.
112. Id.
113. It is interesting, however, that Chief Justice Givan referred to the three justices who
voted for reversal as the "majority." Id.
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Given the errors asserted by the defendant, reversal of the convic-
tion in this case would normally require a retrial.' 14 However, when it
retries the case, the court will once again be faced with at least some of
the same issues which formed the basis of the appeal. For example, the
prosecution will almost certainly again offer into evidence the state-
ment of defendant which he alleged was taken in violation of his Mi-
randa rights. Because a majority of the state supreme court already
determined that the admission of that evidence did not constitute error,
the trial court would be free once again to admit the evidence. 1 5 If this
occurred as to each item on which the appeal was founded, holding a
new trial could be a futile exercise. But as will be more fully argued
later, it is actually unlikely that in most cases, the second trial would
proceed in the same manner as the first. Indeed, the implicit effect of
the reversal of the conviction, even without a majority vote on any one
ground, might be a change of heart by the trial judge as to certain dis-
cretionary rulings.
11 6
What, then, did Chief Justice Givan mean when he asserted that it
was "in keeping with the system" that the court should affirm unless a
majority has agreed on a particular error committed by the trial court?
If he meant that without such agreement, holding a second trial would
be meaningless, he is not likely correct in most cases. If he meant that
the result reached by the case is required by some inherent attribute of
appellate decisionmaking, he is again probably incorrect; "the system"
is not applied the same way in all common law jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, if Bryan had arisen in England, where the general practice is to
issue seriatim opinions,1 17 the appellate determination that some re-
versible error had occurred at trial would result in a reversal without
114. A retrial, however, would not be required in all cases. If, for example, defendant
argued that the facts sought to be proved by the prosecution could not as a matter of law
constitute a crime, no new trial would be called for if the appellate court were to accept the
argument. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). InRedrup, because a major-
ity of the Justices believed that the materials sold by defendant could not constitutionally be
found obscene, there was no need for a new trial. The Court simply reversed the convic-
tions. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Bryan, however, did not raise any issues of
this type. See supra text accompanying note 107.
115. This does not necessarily mean that the trial court would beforced to rule the same
way at the second trial. With certain kinds of errors, the appellate court would only be
holding that it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit the evidence, or that
although error was committed, it was not prejudicial. For issues of that type, it would be
within the trial court's power to refuse to admit the evidence at the second trial. See infra
notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
116. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. The modem English practice in crim-
inal cases might vary somewhat. D. KARLEN, supra note 54, at 115.
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new trial.118 Perhaps, therefore, the result reached by the Indiana court
is more an outgrowth of a particular style of decision-making than of
the needs of the judicial process itself. The question which then must
be faced is whether the disposition of Bryan can be supported in the
larger sense; that is, whether it serves the appellate court's function of
assuring correctness in the trial courts. As will be argued later,119 it
does not.
Another decision of the Indiana Supreme Court raises the same
questions about the discharge of an appellate court's correctness func-
tion. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock 120 was a malicious prosecution
action brought by Sonja Stock, the former lover of Michael Canada,
now deceased. A few months before he died, Canada designated
"Sonja Stock-fiancee" as the beneficiary of an $11,500 life insurance
policy. Two months later, he changed the designation to "Sonja Ca-
nada-wife." The two, however, were never married. Following con-
sultation with Canada's former wife, who wondered if there was any
possibility that their two children might be entitled to the proceeds of
the life insurance policy, an attorney brought a declaratory judgment
action on behalf of Peoples Bank, which was designated personal rep-
resentative of Canada's estate. Sonja Stock and Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company were named as defendants in the action, which
essentially sought to prevent Metropolitan from paying over the pro-
ceeds of the policy to Stock.121 The trial court, however, found that
"Sonja Stock-fiancee" and "Sonja Canada-wife" were the same per-
son, and that Stock was therefore the legally designated beneficiary.
The court entered judgment ordering that the proceeds of the policy be
paid over to Stock. Stock had spent almost $4,000 defending this ac-
tion, which under the law had very little, if any, merit.
Stock then brought the malicious prosecution action against Peo-
ples Bank, and, following a jury verdict awarding her $70,000, judg-
ment was entered in her favor in that amount. Peoples Bank appealed
to the Indiana Court of Appeals, alleging numerous errors including
misapplication of the law of malicious prosecution. The appellate
court, however, unanimously affirmed."- Peoples Bank then sought
review by the Indiana Supreme Court by way of a petition to trans-
118. D. KARLEN, supra note 54, at 100.
119. See infra notes 145-86 and accompanying text.
120. 403 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. 1980).
121. The suit specifically alleged that Stock was "an imposter alleging to be 'Sonja Ca-
nada - Wife."' There was, of course, no Sonja Canada - wife. 1d. at 1080.
122. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock, 392 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. App. 1979).
[Vol. 17
APPELLATE DECISION-MAKING
fer.12 3 Three of the five justices of the Indiana high court wished to
grant the petition and assume jurisdiction over the case, but the three
justices were split two-to-one as to the grounds for granting the peti-
tion. Apparently following a theory later to be used in Bryan, the court
denied the petition. This had the effect of terminating the matter in the
supreme court.1 24
There was sharp disagreement among the three justices who were,
despite their collective majority, designated as dissenters. Two be-
lieved that the court of appeals had "misconstrued the law set out in
decisions on malicious prosecution, and effectively and drastically
changed that cause of action as it originated and as it was understood
to exist up to this point."1 25 The third justice believed that the court of
appeals' decision could be supported except insofar as it had let stand
the $70,000 judgment. This justice would have granted transfer "for
the limited purpose of affirming the judgment conditioned upon a
remittitur." 26
There was no opinion by the two remaining justices who voted to
deny transfer. 27 Neither of the "dissenting" opinions discussed the
propriety of affirming the appellate court's decision in the face of a
three-to-two majority asserting that some error had been committed
below.
The factual and procedural context of Peoples Bank differs mark-
edly from Bryan. First, this was a civil action. Second, review in this
case by the Indiana Supreme Court was discretionary;1 28 in Bryan, the
supreme court's jurisdiction was mandatory.1 29 Despite these differ-
ences, however, the court's handling of the transfer petition raised the
123. IND. R. App. P. 11(B) (West 1982).
124. IND. R. App. P. 11(B)(4) (West 1982).
125. 403 N.E.2d at 1078 (opinion of Pivarnik, J., joined by Givan, CJ.).
126. 403 N.E.2d at 1088 (opinion of Prentice, J.). Justice Prentice did state that if his
reason for granting transfer was not agreed upon, he would vote in the alternative to deny
transfer. Id. Arguably, this alternative vote would create a majority in favor of denying
transfer.
127. The usual Indiana practice of not issuing opinions in support of a decision to deny
transfer is analogous to the practice of the United States Supreme Court when it decides to
deny a petition for writ of certiorari.
128. IND. R. App. P. 4(B) (West 1972), adopted pursuant to IND. CONsT. art. VII, § 6.
129. "[Alppeals from a judgment imposing a sentence of death, life imprisonment or im-
prisonment for a term greater than ten years shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court."
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Bryan was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 45, 20, and 4
years. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. Since the Indiana Constitution grants an
absolute right to one appeal in all cases, supreme court jurisdiction in Bryan was therefore
mandatory. IND. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
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same basic issues about the court's functions as those involved in
Bryan.
By deciding to deny the transfer petition, the court was upholding
the disposition reached by the appellate court, if not its reasoning.
1 30
Were a petition to transfer under Indiana procedure closely analogous
to a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
it could be strongly argued that denial of the petition was unfair be-
cause a majority wished to grant it. The argument would be that the
petitioner was denied a chance to fully brief and argue its claim in the
supreme court even though a majority of the justices wished to hear the
case.13 But peculiarities in the Indiana procedure weaken this argu-
ment, since under that procedure, even the decision to grant transfer
often carries with it no opportunity to further brief or argue the case.
Indeed, the decision whether to grant or deny the petition is not typi-
cally made known until the supreme court's final disposition of the
case.
132
Still, the effects of the court's handling of Peoples Bank demon-
130. IND. R. APP. P. I1(B)(4) (West 1982); B. BAGNi, L. GIDDINGS, & K. STROUD, INDI-
ANA APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 157 (1979).
131. Indeed, in the United States Supreme Court, certiorari will be granted if only four of
the nine Justices vote to grant. R. STEN, & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 346
(5th ed. 1978).
The Indiana Supreme Court once made the following statement about the purpose for
its power to transfer cases from the intermediate appellate court: "The very object of the
statute under which transfers from the Appellate to the Supreme Court are authorized...
is to enable the Supreme Court, when necessary, to control the statements or declarations of
legal principles contained in the opinion of the Appellate Court in the particular case."
Klein v. Nugent Gravel Co., 162 Ind. 509, 509, 70 N.E. 801, 801 (1904) (citing Barnett v.
Bryce Furnace Co., 157 Ind. 572, 573, 62 N.E. 6, 7 (1901)). If by this language the court
meant that in these discretionary cases, the only purpose of review is to provide guidance
concerning the law, then the statement is rather startling. Surely the court would agree that
at least one consideration in determining whether to transfer a case is to correct the actions
of the lower courts and thus assure that the interests of the litigants have been properly
served.
132. IND. R. ApP. P. 11 (West 1982) specifies the following procedure with regard to peti-
tions to transfer- the petition cannot be brought until the court of appeals has first denied a
petition for rehearing. RULE 11(B). Once that has occurred, the transfer petition can be
filed, and it is limited to grounds previously set forth in the petition for rehearing. Id. The
supreme court then decides whether to grant or deny the transfer petition. If the petition is
denied, that ends the matter in the supreme court. RULE 1 I(B)(4). If the petition is granted,
"the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction of the appeal as if originally filed therein, and all
the records, briefs and fies of said cause on appeal shall be transferred to the Supreme
Court." RULE I1(B)(3).
Briefs may be filed in support of and opposing the transfer petition. RULE 1 I(B)(6). It
would therefore appear that there are two steps to the procedure on grants of petitions to
transfer- the court first decides to grant the petition, and then the documents from the court
of appeals are transferred to the supreme court. This would appear to give the litigants
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strate its similarity to Bryan. The court was letting stand a trial court
judgment which a majority felt was defective in ways important
enough to require alteration. As in Bryan, it was the fact that the "dis-
senting" justices could not agree on the nature of the trial court error
which prevented the court from reversing. Moreover, had the court
granted transfer, that action might have meant only that the two jus-
tices who did not wish to assert jurisdiction over the case would have
written an opinion in which they laid out their reasons for finding no
error in the trial court. 3 3 If the justices then acted as they were later to
do in Bryan, they would have affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The case would then look exactly like Bryan. Again, the question is
whether such a disposition would be in accord with an appellate court's
correctness function, or whether, on the other hand, the disposition
runs counter to fundamental principles and purposes of appellate
review.
Before that question is addressed, however, the essential difference
between the problem raised by Tidewater and the obscenity cases, on
the one hand, and by Bryan and Peoples Bank on the other, must be
stressed. The differences which divided the Justices in the obscenity
cases before Miller had to do with the particular tests which each would
apply to the allegedly obscene materials.'34 The various Justices who
in each case made up a majority for reversal of the convictions were
interpreting the demands of the Constitution in different ways to reach
their common conclusion. By their failure to reach consensus on the
test to be applied to the facts of each of these cases, the Justices were
not providing needed guidance to legislators and the lower courts in
opportunities to further brief and perhaps orally argue the matter, once they have learned
that the court has granted the petition.
In practice, the rules are effectuated somewhat differently. At the time of filing of the
petition to transfer, the papers from the court of appeals are also sent along to the supreme
court. The supreme court's decision to grant or deny the petition is not made public until
the decision on the case itself is final. Thus, when a petition is granted, that information will
be included in the same opinion in which the merits of the case are decided. Even the
decision by the court to hear oral argument does not assure that the petition to transfer will
be granted; at times, argument will be ordered and held, and the court will nevertheless
decide to deny transfer. Telephone interview with Karl L. Mulvaney, Indiana Assistant
Supreme Court Administrator (July 14, 1983).
It thus appears that in Indiana, litigants are best advised to make all their arguments at
the same time they file the petition to transfer. Unless this is done, there is some chance that
the supreme court will assert jurisdiction over the case and decide the merits without further
opportunity for briefing or even oral argument.
133. The decision to grant transfer vacates and entirely nullifies the decision of the court
of appeals. IND. R. App. P. 1 l(B)(3) (West 1982). The two justices voting to affirm the trial
court's action would then certainly issue an opinion supportig that disposition.
134. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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particular, and to society in general, concerning the limits of the first
amendment's protections. However, it was only those who might be-
come involved infuture cases, and those charged with enacting legisla-
tion regulating obscenity, who were hurt by the Court's failings. This is
not to minimize the scope of the problem created during this period of
uncertainty. 135 Nevertheless, in each of the cases decided by the Court,
the failure to muster majority support for a test had no direct impact on
the litigants themselves. The litigants in those cases were presumably
more concerned with the result reached by the Court-the disposi-
tion-than with the means by which the Court reached that result.
1 36
The interests of the litigants, then, were properly served in the pre-
Miller obscenity cases, even if the Court perpetuated confusion in the
more general sense.
The situation in Bryan and in Peoples Bank is just the opposite. In
both a general sense and specifically in regard to these cases, the state
court performed its guidance function. For example, the court in
Bryan faced five issues and decided each by a majority vote of no less
than three-to-two. 137 Future litigants will have no unusual problems
understanding the test applied by a majority of the justices as to each of
the issues, or the manner in which the majority applied the tests to the
facts of the case. Indeed, the particular issues raised by Bryan's appeal
were in themselves rather unremarkable; none of the alleged trial court
errors offered direct challenges to reasonably well-established law.'38
135. Seven years after the Court decided that obscenity could be the subject of regulation
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justice Stewart wrote that obscenity may be
"indefinable." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). He
then noted that the Court seemed to be holding that only "hard-core pornography" could be
regulated, and he continued:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.
Id. The frustration implied in Stewart's statement mirrors the difficulties being faced by
people throughout the nation as they tried to come to terms with the different problems
created by attempts to regulate obscenity.
136. In the obscenity cases, this would not have been true if the Court reversed and re-
manded for new trial. In that situation, the litigants would be quite concerned about the
Court's rationale in reversing, particularly in determining the appropriate test to be applied
by the trial court on the obscenity question. The fact that the Court could not reach consen-
sus on the appropriate test, of course, helps to explain why in so many of the pre-Miller
obscenity cases, the Court simply reversed, ordering no new trial. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
137. Recall that the "dissenters" explicitly joined their colleagues on each of the issues
other than the ones with which they disagreed. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text.
138. For a list of the alleged errors raised in Bryan, see supra text accompanying note 107.
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The Bryan court, then, was not facing the kind of important and un-
resolved social issues which were raised in, for example, the obscenity
cases. 39 And the court's resolution of the individual issues which it did
face was clear. The court, therefore, served its general guidance
function.
By the manner in which it disposed of Bryan, the Indiana court
also served its more specific guidance function in that case. Affirming
the conviction leaves nothing for the trial court to do. The conse-
quences of a reversal under the circumstances of the case will be ex-
plored in depth later1 4°
Although the Indiana court served its guidance function in Bryan
and in Peoples Bank, it did not serve its correctness function in those
cases. Recall that in Bryan the court upheld a lengthy prison term,
despite the view of a majority of the court that Bryan was entitled to a
new trial. This result seems wrong not only from the perspective of the
defendant himself, but also from the point of view of the prosecution,
since the state's interests in a criminal case are to seek justice as well as
to convict. 14 1 In Peoples Bank, the defendant-appellant was forced to
pay a judgment of $70,000 which one justice believed was "so excessive
as to demonstrate prejudice, bias and irrationality,' 142 and which two
justices believed was based on a seriously erroneous reading of the law
of malicious prosecution. 143 It ,is not self-evident, however, that a mis-
carriage of justice has occurred in either case. In order to make that
determination, a number of issues must be addressed, beginning with
the question of exactly what a litigant, and especially a criminal de-
fendant, has a right to expect from an appellate court. The next section
of the article will address these issues.
139. This is not to say that the state high courts never face the kinds of broad social policy
questions with which the Supreme Court must grapple. The obscenity cases, for example,
were usually litigated through the state courts before the convictions were challenged in the
United States Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari based
on the five issues raised by the appellant in Bryan. None was of the far-reaching, unsettled
variety that the Court, given its enormous caseload, will normally choose. As already men-
tioned, the Indiana Supreme Court was required to hear the Bryan case. See supra note 129
and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
141. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) (a prosecutor's
duty is to "seek justice, not merely to convict"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8 comment (Final Draft 1982) ("[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate").
142. 403 N.E.2d at 1088 (Prentice, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1078 (Pivarnik, J., joined by Givan, C.J., dissenting).
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IV. DISCHARGE OF THE CORRECTNESS FUNCTION BY A
FRAGMENTED COURT
It already has been asserted that assuring the correctness of lower
court action is a fundamental part of an appellate court's work.1 "
This, however, is only a general description of the correctness function,
and an effort must be made to more precisely define it before it can be
determined whether Bryan and Peoples Bank represent a true break-
down in appellate process. First, a theory according to which litigants
are granted certain specific rights on appeal will be set forth and de-
fended. Then, the implications of and possible problems raised by that
theory will be explored, along with some possible solutions to the
problems which adoption of the theory might entail.
A. The Due Process Implications of the Correctness Function
It is submitted that a litigant, and particularly a criminal defend-
ant, has a right to an appellate disposition consistent with the majority
vote of the judges. If, in deciding a case, a majority of judges believe
that at base, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, then the
starting point should be that a reversal will be ordered 14 based upon
our concept of due process.
Although the Federal Constitution does not require that the states
establish a system of appellate review of either criminal or civil ac-
tions,"4 such review has become an integral part of our adjudicatory
systems. 47 Speaking for the Supreme Court, Justice Black once noted
that all states provide for appeals from criminal convictions because
they "[recognize] the importance of appellate review to a correct adju-
dication of guilt or innocence."' 148 Justice Black's opinion also indi-
cated that once a state has adopted a system of appellate review, that
system must operate within the bounds of both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.149 Thus, the
144. See supra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
145. Theprecise disposition - whether to simply reverse, to order a new trial, to modify
a judgment, or other alternative - poses some problems which will be explored later. See
infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 687-88 (1894)); JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 2, at 7.
147. Some states even make appellate review a matter of constitutional right. See, e.g.,
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
148. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
149. Id. at 18-19. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§1.
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freedom of a state to choose whether or not to establish a system of
appellate review in the first instance does not grant the state unbridled
discretion in its operation. A brief examination of some of the constitu-
tional requirements in terms of access to the courts will lay the founda-
tion for the dispositional right asserted here.
Fundamental fairness is at the root of our notions of due process.
Particularly in criminal prosecutions, in which the government is using
is power against an individual, "there is a right to a fair procedure to
determine the basis for, and legality of, such action."' 150 The due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment assures state criminal defend-
ants that certain rights embedded in the Bill of Rights will be
protected."' 1 But due process does not stop with protection of rights
explicitly spelled out in the Constitution; it also embodies notions of
fundamental fairness as to procedures which the states are not required
to adopt, but have chosen to adopt nonetheless. One of these proce-
dures is appellate review. The Supreme Court has made it clear that if
a state chooses to establish a system of appellate review, it must admin-
ister that system in a manner which does not, without some compelling
governmental reason, infringe on other fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual. Thus, in Burns v. Ohio, 52 the Court held unconstitutional a
system of filing fees for criminal appeals because that system discrimi-
nated against indigent persons and thus effectively denied them equal
access to the appellate courts.'53 And, in Bounds v. Smith, 54 the Court
held that the fundamental right to access to the courts required that
prisoners have access to adequate law library facilities or assistance
from persons trained in the law.'55 As the Court held in GrJin v. Illi-
nois, which required that in criminal cases indigents be provided with
free copies of their trial transcripts, or a functional equivalent:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitu-
tion to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all.. . . But that is not to say that a State that does grant
appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Ap-
150. J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 477
(1978).
151. For example, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the fifth amendment's
prohibition of double jeopardy applies to state criminal prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
152. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
153. Id. at 257-58.
154. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
155. Id. at 828.
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pellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a
defendant. Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons
like petitioner from invidious discrimination.
156
This notion of due process which protects access to the courts is
not limited to criminal cases. In Boddie v. Connecticut,'57 for example,
the Court held that the requirement of a filing fee in divorce actions
could not be applied to indigents because it denied them access to the
courts to exercise their constitutional right to freedom of choice in mar-
ital decisions. 158 In any case in which access to the courts is necessary
in order for one to exercise a fundamental right, the state must assure
that the manner of providing for access does not operate unfairly. 59
The cases involving access to the courts do not of themselves es-
tablish that a criminal defendant or a party in a civil action has a right
to a particular kind of process once the case is actually before the ap-
pellate court. In neither Bryan nor Peoples Bank was access an issue.
In Bryan the court was obliged by the state constitution to hear the
case. 6 In Peoples Bank, while the court ultimately declined to trans-
fer the case, the litigants had the same opportunity to present their ar-
guments to the court as did others involved in appeals the court was not
required to hear. But these cases do strongly imply that once a state
has established a system of appellate review, that system must be made
available to all similarly situated parties on the same basis. Thus,
though there may be nothing to prevent a state from establishing an
appellate procedure which requires a two-thirds vote of the judges in
order to reverse a judgment, once established, that system must be fol-
lowed. An appellate court in that jurisdiction could not arbitrarily
change the rules in a particular case and require a three-fourths vote in
156. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (citations omitted).
157. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court said: "[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that
absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their
claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard." Id. at 377.
158. Id. at 383.
159. Admittedly, this argument is more difficult to make in civil cases, where access to
judicial process is often not essential to the exercise of a fundamental right. Where no fun-
damental right is implicated, it would appear that states are free to allocate the use of their
courts in any way they see fit short of irrationality or arbitariness. See United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding $50 filing fee in bankruptcy proceeding); Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding $25 filing fee for appellate review of determina-
tion of non-eligibility for welfare). See generally, J. NOWAK, supra note 150, at 513-14.
160. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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order to reverse; nor, for that matter, could it reverse on less than a
two-thirds vote. So also, when the various states have established and
long followed a system of reversing judgments upon a majority vote of
the appellate judges, that system cannot be altered spontaneously, and
with no notice, without raising serious due process implications. 6' The
concept of due process in the appellate context must mean more than
simply a right of access. If due process is grounded in normative judg-
ments about what isfair, then it certainly can be said that a litigant on
appeal has a right to expect that his or her case will be adjudicated in
accordance with a previously followed system of decision-making.162 It
is fundamental fairness, therefore, which provides a litigant with a right
to an appellate disposition consistent with the majority vote.
To support this position, the concept of "fairness" in the appellate
process must be more fully explored. Recall, first, the central impor-
tance of the court's correctness function. Justice Black was referring to
this appellate function when he wrote that states provide an appellate
process in criminal cases in order to ensure correct adjudication of guilt
161. In this light, it is especially disconcerting that the Indiana court did not even discuss
its departure from well established practice when it decided to affirm the conviction in Bryan
and to deny transfer in Peoples Bank.
162. Recent Supreme Court decisions in the procedural due process context lend support
to this analysis. The Court has at times looked to state law to determine whether a party has
an interest which rises to a level which is protected by the due process clause. If state law
has established such an interest, due process is implicated. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980), for example, an inmate was involuntarily transferred from a state prison to a mental
hospital pursuant to a procedure established by a Nebraska statute which provides for such
transfer if a designated physician finds that an inmate "suffers from a mental disease or
defect" that "cannot be given proper treatment" in the prison. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-180(l)
(1981). The inmate challenged the procedure under which he was transferred on due pro-
cess grounds. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court finding that both the statutory pro-
cedure and the apparent practice of state authorities created a protectible interest.
This "objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex
practice," that a prisoner would not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental
disease or defect that could not be adequately treated in the prison, gave Jones a
liberty interest that entitled him to the benefits of appropriate procedures in con-
nection with determining the conditions that warranted his transfer to a mental
hospital.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 489-90. The Court also found a protectible interest apart from
the state statute, 445 U.S. at 491-94, but that finding was not required for the Court to review
the constitutionality of the actual procedures used; the statutory and official practice basis
would have been sufficient. The Court went on to hold that in a number of respects, the
procedures used in petitioner's case did not satisfy the requirements of due process. Id. at
494-97.
This analysis can be extended to the present problem. The established practice of dis-
posing of appeals by a majority vote of the judges arguably creates a protectible interest in
having that practice followed in one's own case. Failure to do so violates due process.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
or innocence. 163 Still with reference to criminal cases, this point has
been made forcefully by others.
The central purpose of a criminal appeal is to insure that the
trial court decision was reached fairly and accurately ...
The appellate court's mission is to provide assurance that the
defendant was convicted and sentenced on adequate evidence
and without prejudicial error at trial or in the preliminary
proceedings. In short, the chief function of a criminal appeal
is to see that the appellant was not done an injustice. 164
Correctness may not be as essential a function in civil cases as in
criminal cases, but the correctness function is certainly present in great
force in civil cases as well. It has even been asserted that the test nor-
mally used to review fact finding in criminal cases is more deferential to
the trial court, whether or not the case was tried before a jury, than in
other kinds of cases.1 6 1 If assurance of correctness were not at least an
important function in civil cases, one might expect that the test used to
review the fact-finding process of the trial court in civil cases would be
more deferential.
1 66
As a result, if the correctness function plays a central role in appel-
late review, and it is understood that performance of this function ben-
efits both the litigants (through assuring proper adjudication of their
case and protection of their rights) and society in general (through in-
creasing confidence in the instruments of government"6 7), it follows
that the method of performing the function should comport with basic
concepts of fundamental fairness.
This conclusion can be reached from another direction which be-
gins with an inquiry as to what is meant by saying the appellate court
has a function of assuring "correctness." The answer might be that the
163. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
164. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 2, at 58.
165. Carrington, supra note 15, at 520. Given the fundamental interests at stake in a
criminal prosecution, this is a somewhat curious statement. The author notes immediately
after making this assertion, that the differences between the various standards are "insub-
stantial." Id.
166. Although the precise standard of review always depends upon the kind of error al-
leged (e.g., review of trial court's admission of evidence versus review of decision to grant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict), in most settings the standard of appellate review will
be quite deferential to the trial court. For example, when reviewing the trial court's decision
in Bryan to deny defendant's motions for continuances, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted
an "abuse of discretion" standard. 438 N.E.2d at 714. And even with regard to defendant's
argument that admission of his statements violated his Miranda rights, the court simply
inquired whether there was "substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding." Id. at
718 (citing Works v. State, 266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144 (1977)).
167. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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appellate court's task is to determine whether the trial court properly
identified the legal standards to be applied and, given the facts found,
whether there is support for the conclusions reached upon the applica-
tion of those standards to the facts.'16 If a majority of appellate judges
believes that the trial court committed reversible error either in identi-
fying the proper standards or in applying those standards to the facts,
that majority is asserting that in a fundamental way, the trial court has
not done its job. Appellate judges do not reach such conclusions
lightly; the tests they utilize in measuring the actions of trial courts are
generally quite defferential 1 69 A decision to reverse the judgment of
the trial court, therefore, represents something more than a different
view of the facts or of the law. It represents a conclusion that these
particular litigants were denied the opportunity to have their cases de-
cided correctly. It is a conclusion that losing this opportunity placed
the parties in a position different from those who had the good fortune
to be before a court which did not err in this manner.
Assuring correctness, then is assuring fairness. And it is funda-
mentally unfair for a court majority to declare, on the one hand, that
there was unfairness below, but to refuse, on the other hand, to do any-
thing about it. This point comes more clearly to light when the per-
sonal consequences to the defendant in Bryan are considered. He has
done an act which society rightly condemns. But fundamental princi-
ples of our government declare that he shall have a fair trial. A trial is
held, and errors are alleged to have occurred. A majority of the highest
court of the state finds that there was, indeed, error of a serious enough
nature to require reversal, even though the justices who make up that
majority cannot agree as to the precise nature of that error. The deci-
sion handed down, however, affirms the conviction, and Bryan begins
to serve concurrent prison terms of 45, 20, and 4 years. We, as mem-
bers of the society, must ask whether it is fundamentally fair to force
Bryan to serve these sentences knowing all the while that three of five
members of the high court believed he was entitled to another trial.
Whether this is "fair" or "unfair" is not a matter of abstract logic; it is a
judgment we make based upon our collective experience as human be-
ings, tempered by the demands of a social order. The society cannot
exist without a mechanism for dealing with those who transgress its
rules. But in order to so severely circumscribe the freedom of any of its
members, society has a strong interest in assuring that such a fair set of
168. Here, of course, the precise test used in reviewing the trial court's actions will be
quite important.
169. See supra note 166.
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procedures is available to these people.170 Although this argument may
seem somewhat weaker in the civil context of Peoples Bank, it still must
be remembered that the defendant was forced to pay a substantial sum
of money despite a majority view that prejudicial error had been com-
mitted by the trial court.
Majoritarian rule lies at the very core of our concept of govern-
ment. When voters cast their ballots in an election, the candidate with
the most votes wins regardless of the myriad reasons why the individ-
ual votes were cast. When a majority of legislators vote in favor of a
piece of legislation, the legislation is approved by that body regardless
of the varied reasons why the votes were cast, or even the varied inter-
pretations the members might place on the meaning or effect of the
legislation itself. In appellate courts, the concept of majority rule also
comes into play, as cases are traditionally disposed of in accordance
with a majority vote. To do otherwise goes against the historical grain,
deeply embedded in our concept of a fair government.
Perhaps the argument will be made that in Bryan, the decision of
the court was made in conformity with principles of majority rule. Af-
ter all, a majority of the court explicitly voted against Bryan as to each
of the alleged errors of the trial court.1 71 Therefore, the argument
would run, Bryan's case is almost like five separate cases, and a major-
ity will have agreed in each of the cases, by no less than a three to two
vote, that the asserted error was indeed not an error.
This argument has surface appeal, and in fact was basically the
argument raised by the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court
when he was interviewed about the case.' 72 But closer analysis will
demonstrate that the argument is flawed. First, this was not in fact five
separate cases, but one case involving one defendant. The asserted er-
rors may have been independent of each other,173 but they were con-
nected in at least one important way: they were all part of a single trial
process. It was that one process which was under review, not five sepa-
rate processes as would be true if this were indeed five different cases.
If the concept underlying due process in the evaluation of the trial is to
determine whether the trial was conducted fairly, then it is the whole
trial, and not small pieces of it viewed independently, which must stand
170. Cf. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1003-05 (1978) (asserting that a trial is certainly
a vehicle for determining fact; but as a form of game, it also carries and serves certain values
such as formal equality of opportunity).
171. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
173. There may be some connection between the alleged errors. See infra note 183.
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up to scrutiny. Viewed as a whole, Bryan's trial did not withstand the
scrutiny of a majority of the justices. The problem is that the justices
who believed that some prejudicial error was committed could not con-
vince each other to join in their reasoning. They should not, however,
have stopped at that point.
It is true that appellate judges owe to themselves and their office a
solemn duty of intellectual honesty. That duty requires them to stand
by their firmly held views and, when they think it necessary, to set out
those views in separate opinions.174 But the judges are also engaged in
a collective enterprise. They comprise a single court with the dual task
of offering guidance and assuring the correctness of lower court action.
When a majority of the justices are convinced that prejudicial error
occurred in the trial court, they have at least some duty to seek a way to
resolve their differences and assure that the result reached by their col-
lective body is in accord with their most basic view-in Bryan, that the
conviction could not stand. This process broke down in both Bryan
and Peoples Bank, and the result in each case is that, while each justice
remained steadfast in asserting his views of the law and thus could
comfortably feel that he had helped the court to serve its guidance
function, the individual defendant whose case made possible the very
performance of that guidance function was, arguably, forgotten.
There are times when members of an appellate court are unable to
collectively identify the precise act which rendered the proceedings be-
low unconstitutional. Yet the solution is not to stop there and place
that court's imprimatur on those proceedings. Instead, where no con-
sensus can be reached as to the precise nature of the error, the court's
first job should be to render the basic disposition agreed upon by a
majority. Then, the judges should set forth their reasons for supporting
or opposing the general conclusion. In this regard, the Supreme
Court's handling of Fikes v. Alabama "I is instructive. The defendant,
a twenty-seven-year-old uneducated and possibly mentally ill black
man, was brought to trial in an Alabama state court for burglary with
intent to commit rape. He was convicted and sentenced to death, and
eventually sought a hearing in the Supreme Court. The Court reversed
his conviction on the ground that confessions extracted from him and
offered against him at trial were involuntary or coerced.' 76 The basis of
174. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
175. 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
176. Id. at 196-98. Defendant had also asserted two other errors: (1) that he should have
been allowed to testify at his trial concerning the confessions without subjecting himself to
unlimited cross-examination; and (2) that the selection of the grand jury which indicted him
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this reversal was due process.17 7
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion did not identify a precise
element of defendant's interrogation which made his confession invol-
untary. Indeed, the dissenters pointed out that none of the individual
circumstances of the case rose to the level of circumstances in other
cases in which the Court had found coercion or involuntariness.1 78 De-
spite this, the Court majority was able to conclude that the totality of
the circumstances resulted in a denial of due process.
There is no evidence of physical brutality, and particular
elements that were present in other cases in which this Court
ruled that a confession was coerced do not appear here. On
the other hand, some of the elements in this case were not
present in all of the prior cases. . . .The totality of the cir-
cumstances that preceded the confessions in this case goes be-
yond the allowable limits. The use of the confessions secured
in this setting was a denial of due process. 1
79
Although he joined the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for himself and Justice Brennan, felt the need to set forth his own views
briefly, and he made the same point somewhat more artfully. "No sin-
gle one of these circumstances alone would in my opinion justify a re-
versal. I cannot escape the conclusion, however, that in combination
they bring the result below the Plimsoll line of 'due process.' 9)18
In Fikes, a majority of the Supreme Court believed that there was
something fundamentally wrong with the method by which the state-
ments were elicited from the defendant, and despite its inability to
identify in what precise way the facts made it possible to reach this
conclusion, the Court rendered a judgment in accord with the basic
belief of the majority. The analogy between the problems faced by the
Supreme Court in F/kes and that faced by the Indiana court in Bryan
may not be perfect. A "totality of the circumstances" line of reasoning
would not work as well where the errors asserted by the defendant are
was unconstitutional because there was systematic exclusion of blacks. Id. at 192. The
Court's resolution of the coerced confession issue made it unnecessary to rule on these other
alleged errors.
177. Id. at 197. This case, of course, was decided before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
178. 352 U.S. at 200 (Harlan, J., joined by Reed, I., and Burton, J., dissenting). There
was some disagreement on this issue. The majority opinion did say that the circumstances
here were in some sense worse than those in Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), in
that defendant here was "weaker and more susceptible" than was the defendant in Turner.
352 U.S. at 197.
179. 352 U.S. at 197.
180. Id. at 199 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
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truly independent. There is some possibility that the two errors found
to exist by a majority of the Indiana court-that the defendant's Mi-
randa rights were violated because he had not knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his right to consult with counsel before giving a
statement; 81 and that the procedure under which he was found compe-
tent to stand trial violated a statute' 82 were not truly independent.18 3
But even if the errors were completely independent, the fact remains
that if the trial is taken as a whole, it can be said that a majority of the
court believed that there was serious enough error to require reversal.
This view of the decision-making process on appeals posits that
the basic task of the court is to determine whether there was error at the
trial level substantial enough to meet the particular standard for deter-
mining whether a reversal is required. This does not mean that the
court's discussion of the particular ground of error is mere dictum; on
the contrary, to call it so would be to invalidate large portions of what
is considered "law."'184 What it does mean is that on appeal, the case
181. 438 N.E.2d at 719-22 (opinion of DeBruler, J., joined by Hunter, J.).
182. Id. at 722 (opinion of Prentice, J.).
183. There was much testimony at trial concerning the taking of defendant's statement,
which was alleged to have been in violation of his Miranda rights. Both the main opinion
and the opinion of Justice DeBruler, contain large portions of both the transcripts of this
statement and the testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the taking of the state-
ment. Defendant's statement itself reflecis great confusion about his rights, as noted in Jus-
tice DeBruler's opinion. Id. at 721.
Not only does the defendant seem to have been confused about his rights, but both his
statement and the specific facts of the crime reflect a person at least very troubled, and
possibly mentally deranged. For example, after raping the victim several times, Bryan made
her get into the trunk of the car. Shortly afterward, he returned to the trunk, opened it, and
asked the victim if she could breathe. She said yes, and Bryan then asked her where he
could cut her throat in order to kill her. It was then that he took a knife from the victim's
key chain and cut her. The victim went limp. He cut her some more and once again closed
the trunk. Later, he opened the trunk again, poked the victim, and said, "Oh, God, she's
dead." Id. at 711. The manner in which this crime was committed at least brings into
question the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, and perhaps also raises the question
of his competency to stand trial.
In this sense, the question of defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights and his competency to stand trial can be seen to be related. Justice Prentice, who
believed that the statutory procedure for determining competency had been violated,
pointed out that there was some doubt in the trial court that defendant had the ability to
understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense. Id. at 722. If these
two questions are indeed related, the analogy to ikes is closer, and it could be said more
easily that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that there was error in the trial
court requiring a reversal. In light of these possibly interrelated errors, it is especially dis-
concerting that the justices could not reach agreement about the grounds of reversal.
184. R. CRoss, supra note 3, at 84-85. Cross' point is that when an appellate court deter-
mines that there has not been a substantial miscarriage of justice, it would be wrong to call
its discussion of the alleged errors dictum.
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must be seen as a whole; the primary question before the court is
whether to affirm or reverse. To render an answer to that question
which does not comport with the wishes of a majority is defective deci-
sion-making.
This point is highlighted by once more referring to the English
practice of rendering seriatim opinions." 5 Had Bryan arisen in Eng-
land, the result would have been a reversal because the individual
opinions, added together, would have mandated that result.1 8 6 It sim-
ply does not seem appropriate that differences in the particular methods
by which decisions are reached should govern the substance of the
cases. Once again, this offends our notion of fairness and suggests a
violation of due process.
In sum, as appellate courts become increasingly divided in their
attempts to deal with the cases which come before them, their members
must be aware not only of the possibility that the courts might be fail-
ing in their guidance function, but also of the possibility that the inter-
ests of the litigants in those cases might not be adequately served.
Assuring correctness in the trial court cannot stop when each judges
individually applies appropriate tests to what transpired below. Assur-
ing correctness also requires the appellate court to act as a single entity,
with the judges cooperating as much as possible to reach a result which
at the very least is consistent with the views of a majority. To fail to
render a disposition which has majority support runs so counter to our
ingrained concepts of fairness that it is arguably a violation of due
process.
B. Conduct of Appellate Judges as Supportfor the Theory
An admittedly speculative way of supporting the proposition that
a litigant has a right to an appellate disposition consistent with the ba-
sic view of a majority of the court is to examine what appellate courts
actually do. Such an examination reveals that despite both the great
potential for results such as those reached in Bryan and Peoples Bank,
and despite deep divisions in the views of appellate judges, courts al-
most never dispose of cases contrary to the wishes of the majority. It
would seem quite possible that appellate judges sense the impropriety
of that result, and take steps to assure that it does not occur.'8 7
The possibility that judges will be divided not only as to the rea-
185. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
186. An analogous result would have occurred in Peoples Bank. The court would have
granted the petition to transfer and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
187. This is largely a subject for speculation because the behind-the-scenes deliberations
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soning which supports the decision to affirm or reverse, but also as to
the ground on which that result rests, is always present. The most obvi-
ous kind of case which harbors such potential is one in which an appel-
lant raises a number of mutually independent issues, any one of which,
if resolved in that party's favor, would require a reversal of the judg-
ment rendered by the trial court.188 Bryan is basically that kind of
case.' 9 Criminal appeals in general quite often pose a series of in-
dependent points for appellate review, and since in many criminal
cases, state high courts are required to hear the appeals, 190 the reporters
contain countless examples of multi-issue criminal decisions rendered
by state supreme courts. In any one of those cases, there lurks the pos-
sibility that a majority of the judges would wish to reverse the convic-
tion, but that no majority would agree as to the particular error
committed by the trial court.191
People v. Robertson,192 a recent decision of the California Supreme
Court, is a good example of a multi-issue criminal appeal in which the
potential for disagreement about the ground on which to reverse was
clearly present. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder. Pursuant to the state's death penalty legislation, nine "special
circumstances" were found which formed the basis of the jury's deci-
sion to impose the death penalty.193 On appeal and by way of a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, defendant made numerous claims which
he asserted warranted reversal. No fewer than eight of the claims re-
of appellate courts are seldom made public. But see W. MURPHY, supra note 4; R. WOOD-
WARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 44.
188. See R. CROSS, supra note 3, at 82.
189. But see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (Indiana provision). See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 11; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982) (automatic appeal to Califor-
nia Supreme Court where trial court has imposed death penalty).
191. This situation is not limited to criminal appeals, though the assignment of numerous
independent errors might be somewhat greater in criminal cases in part because of an attor-
ney's ethical obligations. In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court
held that the appointed lawyer's role as advocate requires that he support the client's appeal
to the best of his ability as long as the appeal is not frivolous. If after conscientious exami-
nation of the record, the lawyer believes the appeal is frivolous, he can seek permission to
withdraw, but must accompany the request with "a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal." Id. at 744. The court is then obligated to furnish
the indigent defendant with counsel's brief and a chance to raise any points he chooses.
Finally, the court must itself fully examine the proceedings to determine if the appeal is
wholly frivolous. Id. These procedures help make the raising of multiple, independent is-
sues a common occurrence in criminal appeals.
192. 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
193. The "special circumstances" are now listed in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West
Supp. 1983).
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lated to the question of guilt, including a claim that defendant was pro-
vided with constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.' 94
Defendant also made five claims of error concerning the finding of spe-
cial circumstances, 95 and another series of claims concerning the pen-
alty phase of the trial.' 96 In total, therefore, defendant raised more
than sixteen claims of error, divided into three classes. Any one of the
claims, if accepted by the court and found to have affected a substantial
right of the defendant, 97 would have warranted reversal. A three-jus-
tice bloc, joined by a single concurring justice, formed a bare majority
for reversal.198 The decision to reverse was formally made on a single
ground, 199 and the concurring justice joined the plurality by agreeing
that there had been error in this respect.2°° However, given the close
vote on the matter of whether to affirm or reverse the conviction, and
the large number of errors raised by the defendant, there was a sub-
stantial possibility that the concurring justice might have believed that
reversal was warranted for a completely different reason than that
found by the other justices.20'
Therefore, there is a question as to the proper disposition of multi-
issue cases. As a result, the problem which this article addresses is
lurking in countless cases. Indeed, whenever appellate judges disagree
about the precise error committed below so that they cannot give clear
instructions on remand, the potential for confusion is present.20 2
194. 33 Cal. 3d at 36-45, 655 P.2d at 285-92, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 83-90.
195. Id. at 45-52, 655 P.2d at 292-97, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 90-95.
196. It is difficult to determine the exact number of claims made concerning the penalty
phase because the court reversed as to one and only discussed two of the other alleged
errors. Id. at 53-60, 655 P.2d at 297-302, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 95-101.
197. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1258 (West 1982).
198. Seven justices sit on the California Supreme Court.
199. The court held that since it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to instruct
the jury sua sponte in deciding on the death penalty, the court could not consider evidence
of other crimes as aggravating circumstances unless it first found that those crimes had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 33 Cal. 3d at 53-55, 655 P.2d at 297-99, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
95-97. The court remanded for a new trial on the penalty issue.
200. Id. at 60-63, 655 P.2d at 302-05, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 101-03 (Broussard, J., concurring).
201. As it stood, the concurring justice did not join the main opinion largely because he
felt its reasoning was too broad. Id.
202. The obscenity cases decided by the Supreme Court prior to its decision in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), could provide examples. Suppose that the only alleged
ground for reversal was a failure to use the appropriate test for determining whether the
material was obscene. If a majority of the Court believed the trial court did not use the
correct test, but no majority could be reached as to what test was appropriate, the potential
for a problem analogous to that of Bryan and Peoples Bank would arise. This might help
explain the Court's pre-Miller practice of summarily reversing convictions. See supra note
92 and accompanying text.
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A sampling of high court criminal decisions from four different
states over a ten-year period, however, has uncovered no other in-
stances in which a court disposed of a case contrary to the wishes of a
majority."' Obviously, the search method does not permit ruling out
the possibility that some such decisions do exist, particularly in the civil
context. However, the methodology certainly permits the conclusion
that such occurrences are extremely rare. Further, no United States
Supreme Court decisions could be found in which such a result
occurred.2 4
Why haven't more courts reached the same conclusion as that
reached twice by the Indiana court, when there is so much division
among appellate judges? The reason for this, as stated at the beginning
of this section, is subject to speculation. One possibility, however, is
that appellate judges simply perceive that to reach a result contrary to
the most basic point on which a majority of the members of the court
agree, is improper. Believing this, the judges compromise, perhaps
finding the highest common denominator in their views and disposing
of the case accordingly. 0 5 Indeed, to assure that justice has been done,
judges will at times take action contrary to their views if they believe
203. The sampling was conducted in the following manner: all criminal decisions of the
highest courts of California, New York, Alabama, and Indiana for the period 1973 to 1983
were reviewed. Each case was scrutinized first to determine whether there was a majority
opinion. If there was a majority opinion, there was no reason to look further. However, if
there was no majority opinion, the case was further scrutinized to determine whether it was
disposed of in conformity with the wishes of those judges who made up the plurality. De-
spite the fact that over nine hundred appellate decisions in all were examined, scores of
which were plurality decisions, no other instances could be found. California and New
York were chosen because of their size and reputation as leading courts, as well as for the
strong possibility that many of the decisions of their highest courts would contain dissents.
Alabama was chosen as a representative of a different region of the country, and Indiana
was selected for this reason as well as the reason that it was the Indiana Supreme Court
which decided Bryan and Peoples Bank. The search was made possible by using the key
word capabilities of Lexis. Criminal cases were searched because their case names are de-
noted by "People" or "State," terms easily recognized by Lexis. Criminal cases, it was be-
lieved, also held greater potential for producing the kind of split vote found in Bryan. See
supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. Although over nine hundred cases were re-
viewed, the actual number of criminal cases for the four states during the ten year period
was larger. This was because the Lexis search disposed of those cases in which no dissenting
opinion appeared.
204. For this conclusion, articles discussing Supreme Court plurality decisions were the
main source of information. See, e.g., Chicago Comment, supra note 6; Harvard Note, supra
note 6.
205. For a discussion of the "highest common denominator" method of avoiding overly
splintered decision-making, see Davis & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 82. See also Harvard
Note, supra note 6, at 1131-32 (referring to a "common ground" approach and noting where
it might and might not work).
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that the correctness function will be better served by such action. In
those instances, the judge will engage in compromise in order to assure
that the court's action will both serve the interests of the parties and
satisfy the court's desire to reach consensus. There is direct and indi-
rect evidence that such a process does indeed take place on appellate
courts.
The manner in which the United States Supreme Court dealt with
a serious split in views as to the proper disposition of Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Cushing2"s presents one explicit example of compromise. A
towboat navigating a Louisiana river attempted to pass under a bridge.
It collided with a concrete pier and capsized. Five seamen drowned in
the accident. The owner and charterer of the towboat filed petitions in
admiralty in the United States District Court in Louisiana to limit their
liability under provisions of the Limited Liability Act.2 °7 The district
court then issued an injunction prohibiting suit against the owner and
charterer elsewhere than in that limitation proceeding. However, the
representatives of the five seamen who had drowned subsequently
brought this action in the same district court against the owner of the
bridge and the liability insurers of the towboat's owner and charterer.
Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and on the
Jones Act,20 8 and the plaintiffs relied on a provision of the Louisiana
Insurance Code permitting direct suit against the insurer within the
policy's terms and limits.2°9 The insurers moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the state statute did not apply to marine insur-
ance, and that in any case, application of the statute would go against
general maritime law and the essential purpose of federal law in that
field. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. 2 10
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
district court had read the state statute too restrictively, and that the
statute was no more than a permissible regulation of insurance author-
ized by federal law, and not in conflict with any feature of admiralty
law. 21I The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.212
The question which the Court agreed to decide was whether the
206. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
207. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183, 186 (1976). These sections limit the liability of an owner or char-
terer, except in certain cases, to the amount or value of the interest of the owner.
208. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The act permits seamen injured in the course of
employment to recover damages at law.
209. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978) (current version).
210. Cushing v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 99 F. Supp. 681, 684 (E.D. La. 1951).
211. Cushing v. Maryland Casualty Co., 198 F.2d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1952).
212. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 345 U.S. 902 (1953).
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application of the Louisiana statute would violate the Jones Act, the
Limited Liability Act, or the Constitution's grant to the federal govern-
ment of exclusive jurisdiction in maritime matters. All nine Justices
agreed that the Louisiana statute, insofar as it permitted direct actions
against the insurers of shipowners and charterers who instituted limita-
tion proceedings, was not in violation of the Jones Act. The Court,
however, split down the middle on the question of whether the Limited
Liability Act foreclosed the actions against the insurers. Justice Frank-
furter, joined by Justices Reed, Jackson, and Burton, asserted that the
federal law did indeed foreclose the actions under the state statute, and
that therefore the judgment of the district court dismissing the plain-
tiffs action against the insurers should be reinstated.213 Justice Black,
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Minton, con-
cluded that the action under state law was not foreclosed by the Lim-
ited Liability Act.214 These eight Justices split the same way on the
question of whether the application of the state statute could be justi-
fied by a provision of federal law2" 5 which states that no act of Con-
gress, except under limited circumstances, could invalidate a state law
that tries to regulate business insurance. Justice Clark took a middle
position, stating that the Limited Liability Act did not prevent an ac-
tion against insurers under the state statute, but that the action against
the insurers could not be decided before the limitation proceeding was
brought to a close and the liability of the owners determined.2"6
The Court was therefore deadlocked. In cases in which the
Supreme Court is evenly split, it will affirm the decision of the highest
previous court.217 In this case, that would have meant the decision of
the court of appeals permitting the action against the insurers to pro-
ceed would have been validated despite the views of five of the Justices
either that the action was precluded, or that it could not proceed until
the limitation action had been brought to a conclusion.21 8 Justice
213. 347 U.S. at 421-22.
214. Id. at 436-37.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
216. 347 U.S. at 423-25.
217. The Court will usually affirm per curiam, without opinion. See, e.g., United States
v. Klinger, 345 U.S. 979 (1953); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 326 U.S.
696 (1946).
218. Viewed from a different perspective, it is true that a majority of the Court (Justices
Clark, Black, Douglas, Minton, and Chief Justice Warren) did believe that the action could
proceed, but not on the same terms, since Justice Clark believed it could not go forward
until the limitation proceeding was concluded. Thus, even viewed from the other perspec-
tive, it is still true that disposing of the case by a straight affirmance of the court of appeals
would have been against the express views of a majority of the Court.
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Frankfurter and those who joined his opinion perceived that such a
result would be wrong, and therefore decided to compromise their
views to permit a disposition consistent with the views of Justice Clark:
In order to break the deadlock resulting from the differ-
ences of opinion within the Court and to enable a majority to
dispose of this litigation, we vacate the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and order the case to be remanded to the District
Court to be continued until after the completion of the limita-
tion proceeding. 1 9
Maryland Casualty Co., therefore, was a case in which the Justices
of a deadlocked Supreme Court took appropriate action to assure that
the ultimate disposition accorded as nearly as possible with the views of
a majority of the Justices. True, Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues
significantly compromised their position in order to assure such a re-
sult, but the point is that the Justices were not content to write their
separate opinions and let the case go despite the disposition to which
such action would have led. Instead, they noted the implications of
their varied positions and reassessed.220 In doing so, they may not have
provided clear guidance to future litigants about the limits of the states'
power to permit such actions against maritime insurers, but they no
more disserved their guidance function than would have been the case
had they not compromised on the disposition. The result of the case,
therefore, is that the litigants' interests were served to the best of the
Court's ability without sacrificing any other significant function of the
Court.
A second Supreme Court decision also exemplifies explicit com-
promise in order to reach results most in accord with the views of a
majority. Screws v. United States221 was a federal prosecution of Geor-
gia law enforcement officers arising out of the beating death of a black
man. The defendants were convicted under provisions of the criminal
code 2 for violating the civil rights of the man. The court of appeals
219. 347 U.S. at 423.
220. In some sense, the Frankfurter group had to move further to compromise than the
Black group would have had to move. The latter group could still have maintained that the
Limited Liability Act did not foreclose the action under the state statute, but that the action
should await the conclusion of the limitation proceeding. By its act of compromise, the
Frankfurter group abandoned its basic view that the action under the state statute was com-
pletely foreclosed.
221. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
222. 18 U.S.C. §§ 52, 88 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976)). The current version
provides:
Whoever, under color of any law.. . willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state,
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
[Vol. 17
APPELLATE DECISION-MAKING
affirmed the conviction,"' and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 4
The Court was badly divided. Justice Douglas, in an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed, stated that
a new trial was required primarily because the trial court had not in-
structed the jury that in order to convict the defendants under the stat-
ute, they must find a specific intent to deprive a person of a right
specifically provided for in the Constitution or laws, or decisions inter-
preting them.225 Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson wished to
reverse the convictions outright on the ground that the federal law was
not intended to be applied to defendants' conduct.226 Justice Murphy
believed that the convictions could stand, and that no new trial was
needed.227 Finally, Justice Rutledge separately reached the same con-
clusion.228 The vote, therefore, was as follows: four Justices favored
reversal for new trial; three favored outright reversal with no new trial;
and two, for different reasons, favored affirming the convictions. There
was thus no majority supporting any particular disposition of the case.
Once again, had no Justice compromised, the Court would have con-
sidered itself deadlocked and automatically affirmed the action of the
court of appeals. 229 This would have required sustaining the convic-
tions, a result desired by only two Justices.
Justice Rutledge, however, believed that such a result would not
be proper, and he decided that, despite his own views, he would join
the opinion of those of his brethren with whose views he was most in
accord, and thereby create a majority:
My convictions are as I have stated them. Were it possi-
ble for me to adhere to them in my vote, and for the Court at
the same time to dispose of the cause, I would act accordingly.
The Court, however, is divided in opinion. If each member
accords his vote to his belief, the case cannot have disposition.
Stalemate should not prevail for any reason, however compel-
ling, in a criminal cause or, if avoidable, in any other. My
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. . shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both ....
223. 140 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1944).
224. 322 U.S. 718 (1944).
225. 325 U.S. at 103-07 (opinion of Douglas, J., joined by Stone, C.J., and Black and
Reed, JJ.). The opinion also held that defendants did act under color of law. Id. at 107.
226. Id. at 138-39 (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
227. Id. at 137-38 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 113, 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
229. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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views concerning appropriate disposition are more nearly in
accord with those stated by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS
.... Accordingly, in order that disposition may be made of
this case, my vote has been cast to reverse .... 230
Here, then, was a situation in which a particular Justice believed
that despite his own views as to the proper disposition of the case, it
was necessary to enter into some form of compromise. Ironically, had
Justice Rutledge adhered to his views, the case would have been dis-
posed of in the manner he most wanted.231 But he believed this would
be an improper result. Although his opinion is not explicit regarding
why he held this belief, Justice Rutledge certainly felt that, particularly
in criminal cases, it is improper to affirm a conviction without the con-
currence of a majority of the Justices.2
The point here is not that the Justices of the Supreme Court will
always compromise rather than permit the fortuity of a deadlock to
dictate their disposition. Indeed, the Court has on occasion completed
its work on a case evenly divided." 3 There are also occasions on which
the Supreme Court disposes of cases in a manner which does not fully
meet the views of a majority of its Justices.234 The point, rather, is that
explicit compromise occurs on the Court for reasons which are not fully
enunciated, but which seem clearly to include some notion that it
230. 325 U.S. at 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
231. At least one author has criticized Justice Rutledge's action: "A desire that courts
should always decide a case is understandable, but to take a position contrary to personal
belief to achieve this result seems to be an undesirable and unnecessary concession to form
at the expense of substance." Comment, Constitutional Law, 44 MICH. L. REv. 814, 816
(1946). This criticism seems unduly harsh, particularly when viewed in light of a seven-
member majority whose highest common denominator was the belief that the convictions
could not stand.
232. Another instance in which a Supreme Court Justice voted with an eye to avoiding a
deadlock can be found in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). There, Justice
White, concurring, wrote: "Pending full-scale reconsiderations of [Draper v. United States],
358 U.S. 307 (1959), on the one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the other, I join
the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm
would produce an evenly divided court." Id. at 429.
233. See supra note 217.
234. See, eg., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), in which the issue was whether a
unanimous jury verdict was constitutionally required in state criminal trials. Eight Justices
agreed that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which had held that the sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial was fully incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, was still good
law. However, these eight Justices split four-to-four on whether the sixth amendment re-
quired a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases. Justice Powell believed that unanimity
was required for federal, but not for state, trials. Thus, eight Justices believed that the same
standard was applicable to state as to federal criminal trials, and five believed that unanim-
ity was required for federal criminal trials. Nevertheless, the Court held that unanimity was
not required for state criminal trials. See Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1133-34.
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would be improper to dispose of the case without compromise. This
suggests an awareness that the Court may be failing to serve one of its
functions by disposing of cases in a manner which is fundamentally
inconsistent with the views of a majority of the Justices.
Sometimes the acts of compromise by appellate judges are not
made explicitly, but instead must be inferred from the way in which
they vote in particular cases. Most especially, when a judge simply
joins a plurality, indicating only that he "concurs in the judgment,"
that judge has assumed a pivotal role in the decision of the case. This
has occurred a number of times on the Supreme Court."~ In cases of
this type, the concurring Justice, by joining in the disposition wished by
the plurality, assures that his view about the case's disposition will pre-
vail while at the same time avoiding having to join in the reasoning of
the plurality. Of course, there can be numerous reasons for a judge's
decision to concur without opinion, but one possibility is that the judge
has decided to compromise rather than state a view that would make
the case difficult to dispose of in a satisfactory way. Therefore, these
may also be cases in which significant compromise occurs in order to
best serve the interests of the litigants in the face of a divided court.
Action of this type, of course, is not limited to the Supreme Court.236
In sum, the conduct of appellate judges seems to suggest that they
perceive some impropriety in disposing of cases in a manner which is
fundamentally at odds with the views of a majority. First, dispositions
analogous to those of Bryan and Peoples Bank rarely occur; and sec-
ond, there is strong evidence that the reason that we rarely see such
dispositions is that appellate judges take deliberate actions to avoid
them. Once again, the mere conduct of appellate judges does not by
itself prove that Bryan and Peoples Bank are constitutionally invalid.
It does suggest, however, that judges-the individuals we have en-
trusted with devising rational and fair methods of decision-making-
have themselves concluded that the practice is at least to be avoided,
and is perhaps constitutionally defective.
C. Implications of Adoption of the Theory
Several possible consequences would attend acceptance of the the-
ory that it is a violation of due process for an appellate court to render
a disposition contrary to the vote taken by the judges. This subject has
235. See, e.g., cases cited in Chicago Comment, supra note 6, at 124-34.
236. In California, for example, see People v. White, 16 Cal. 3d 791, 798, 549 P.2d 537,
541, 129 Cal. Rptr. 769, 773 (1976).
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already been alluded to previously. 2 7
In approaching this issue, three assumptions will be made. First, it
will be assumed that a majority of the appellate judges believes that
some error was committed in the trial court which necessitates reversal.
Second, it will be assumed that the judges are in disagreement about
the precise ground on which reversal should occur. And third, it will
be assumed that the judges are unwilling or unable to compromise their
positions. Both Bryan and Peoples Bank satisfy each of these
assumptions.
If it is accepted that the appellate court cannot, consistent with due
process, affirm the decision of the trial court when a majority of the
judges believes that some reversible error was committed, two options
are available to the court. Unfortunately, each poses certain institu-
tional or procedural problems which makes the solution problematic.
However, because of the due process problem, an option which should
not be available to the court is to affirm, at least in all respects, the
disposition of the lower court. Two options will be explored, together
with their advantages and disadvantages: outright reversal (with no
new trial), and reversal for a new trial.
1. Reversal without new trial
A first possibility would be simply to reverse and enter judgment
for the appellant. This option, however, has its difficulties, though the
disadvantages would be far greater for civil than for criminal cases.
In criminal matters, reversal without new trial would follow Eng-
lish procedure where retrial does not occur once an appellate court
finds reversible error to have occurred at the trial.238 Although this
would be contrary to American practice, the position is not without
some support. Nevertheless, to reverse without new trial would surely
provoke a strong reaction from some members of the public, who will
perceive that the court system will have failed in at least two respects:
it will have failed to punish a person already found guilty at one trial;
and it will not have offered members of the society needed protection
from dangerous individuals. Despite the possible availability in some
cases (including perhaps Bryan) of civil means of taking control over
the individual,139 the public may nevertheless perceive that the court
237. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
238. D. KA.RLEN, supra note 54, at 110. The reason probably derives from the English
view of the doable jeopardy problem. Id.
239. IND. CODE §§ 16 14-9.1-3 to 9.1-18 (West 1982) provide for involuntary commit-
ment of individuals found to be suffering from a mental illness and who are either danger-
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will not have performed two of its most important functions.
Still, there is support for outright reversal in criminal cases. Our
constitutional system places a heavy burden on the state to conduct a
trial which not only proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but also assures that the defendant's constitutional rights have
been preserved. These are what our system considers to be the ele-
ments of justice in criminal proceedings, and judges play an important
role in the drama which is the criminal process. That role is to assure
that both aspects of the state's burden have been satisfied before a per-
son is subjected to punishment. Appellate courts, as have been shown,
serve as a further check on the process.24° When, therefore, the courts
have proven unable to perform their functions, punishment cannot be
meted out. Arguably, this is what has occurred in cases such as Bryan.
Unable to come to some agreement about the nature of the reversible
error which occurred at trial, but nevertheless voting by a majority that
such error did indeed occur, the appellate court has proven unable to
perform its function fully. The criminal defendant cannot be held re-
sponsible for this breakdown in the adjudicatory system, and should
not therefore be forced to suffer for that dysfunction.
In civil cases, the problem is quite different. In that context, the
English and American practice is the same. Unless no purpose would
be served by holding a new trial,2"' the matter will be remanded upon
reversal by the appellate court. That result seems justified. The pre-
vailing party in the trial court is not in a position analogous to the state
following a successful prosecution of a criminal defendant. Whereas
assuring that justice is done is a fundamental part of the state's function
in any criminal prosecution, a civil party's role is merely to present the
strongest possible case consistent with an honest view of the facts and a
reasonable reading of the law.24 If the appellate process fails to yield a
ously or gravely disabled. IND. CODE § 16-14-9.1-1 (West 1982) defines "dangerous" as "a
condition in which a person as a result of mental illness presents a substantial risk that he
will harm himself or others."
240. Recall that it has been asserted that correctness is the-primary function of appellate
courts in criminal cases. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
241. If the appellate court holds that even given a particular party's view of the facts, that
party cannot prevail, there would of course be no reason to conduct a new trial. See supra
note 114.
242. A lawyer's general duty is to "represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law ... ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC 7-1 (1982). If the position
taken is "supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of the law," the advocate is acting ethically. Id. at EC 7-4. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.1 (Final Draft 1982) takes essentially the same
position.
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clear reason for the error in the trial court, it has failed not only the
appellant, but the prevailing party as well. It would therefore be
grossly unfair not to grant the prevailing party another opportunity to
present his case. Reversal without new trial in the civil context would
therefore not appear to be a viable option in the event that the appel-
late court cannot agree on the nature of the error committed below.
2. Reversal and remand for new trial
The second option would be simply to reverse for new trial, even
though the appellate judges wishing that result do not agree on the
ground on which the trial court erred. This solution poses one prob-
lem: the trial court may be in a quandary about what action to take
when, on retrial, the presentation of evidence poses the same problems
which were alleged to have constituted error in the first trial and
formed the basis for the appeal. Under some circumstances, a trial
court might feel compelled to rule on each issue in precisely the same
manner as at the first trial, and if that occurs, holding a second trial
might be something of a futile exercise.
However, the extent to which a remand would be futile will de-
pend to a great degree on the nature of the issues which formed the
basis of the appeal. For present purposes, those issues can be classified
into two categories: (1) those in which the trial court, on remand, will
effectively have no choice but to repeat the ruling it made at the first
trial; and (2) those in which the trial court would be acting within its
discretion in reversing its prior ruling on remand.243 The Bryan case
presents examples of both types of issues.
Defendant's claim in Bryan that his statement to the police could
not be admitted at trial because it was taken in violation of his Miranda
rights is an example of the first kind of issue. Two of the justices
agreed with defendant as to this ground.244 There is little doubt that
given the inculpatory nature of the statements and the fact that they
issued from the defendant himself, the prosecution will once again offer
them at trial. It is also likely that defendant, encouraged by a two-
member supreme court minority, will again object to their admission.
But given the probative value of the statements and a three-to-two
supreme court ruling that the statements were not taken in violation of
243. The model of the categories of issues presented here is rough, and could be the
subject of further exploration which is beyond the scope of the present article.
244. Justices DeBruler and Hunter believed that admission of the statements was error,
and that a new trial should be held, without admitting the statements. See supra note 109
and accompanying text.
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defendant's Miranda rights, the trial court will almost certainly over-
rule defendant's objection and again admit the statements. Indeed, a
contrary decision might be the impetus of a prosecution petition for
writ of mandate to force the court to obey the majority holding of the
supreme court.245 This motion could well succeed even though a writ
of mandate is an extraordinary remedy which will seldom be ordered
unless a trial court has failed to act where it was under a duty to act.
2
46
This would likely be such a case.247 The trial court would therefore be
in a corner. It would almost certainly have to admit the statement.
And if every ground forming the basis of the appeal falls into this cate-
gory, a remand would be a costly and worthless exercise.248
It is highly unlikely, however, that every ground of an appeal will
fall into this first category. More likely, at least some (and probably
most) of the issues raised on appeal will concern matters about which
the trial court had discretion. In those situations, an appellate court's
failure to reverse will not be a holding that the trial court had to take
the action it took, but only that such action was within its discretion.
An analogous situation for present purposes would be one in which the
appellate court affirms because although the trial court was in error, the
error was not prejudicial.249 In either situation, the trial court could
well decide to rule differently on remand, and a writ of mandate would
245. In Indiana, the procedure is set forth in IND. R. PROC. ORIGINAL ACTIONS 2 (West
1981).
246. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery Circuit Court, 399 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ind. 1980).
247. Defendant might perhaps argue that even if the statement was not inadmissible on
Miranda grounds, the trial court should nevertheless refuse to admit it on some other
ground, such as that the probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. See FED. R. EVID. 403. However, given the great probative
value of a defendant's statement which was not taken in violation of his Miranda rights or
otherwise coerced, and the lack of any real danger of unfair prejudice, it would almost never
be appropriate to refuse to admit such a statement. If the trial court did so, a writ of man-
date may be in order.
248. In Bryan, if all the alleged errors were seen as falling into this first category, then
holding a second trial would indeed be futile. Defendant's only hope would be a more
favorable finding by the trier of fact on the question of guilt. Ironically, Bryan made no
argument on appeal that the jury had wrongly applied the facts and found him guilty of the
crimes; with regard to the jury's factfinding, Bryan's only argument was that some of the
evidence which the jury was permitted to hear was improperly admitted. Bryan, 438 N.E.2d
at 714-18. However, as will be argued shortly, not all of the alleged errors in Bryan were of
this first type. See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
249. In People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982), for
example, one of the alleged errors was that the trial court should have instructed the jury
that in deciding the question of guilt, it should not consider the subject of the penalty. The
California Supreme Court held that it was indeed error not to so instruct the jury, but that
the error was nonprejudicial. Id. at 36-37, 655 P.2d at 285-86, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84. See
supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
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rarely if ever issue to reverse such action. An example in Bryan was
defendant's assertion that the trial court should have granted his mo-
tion for a continuance made on the day of trial. On appeal, the court
held only that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion" in denying
the motion."' 0 Should it be faced with similar circumstances at the new
trial, the court could certainly grant such a motion with no concern
whatever that its action would be subject to a writ of mandate. Simi-
larly, and perhaps more realistically, the trial court in Bryan will al-
most certainly have to undertake another inquiry into defendant's
competency to stand trial."5 ' When making this determination, the
court could well decide to follow the letter of the statutory procedure,
thus heading off any new procedural challenge to its finding. No party
would have cause to complain about such a decision.
Therefore, to the extent that the errors asserted by an appellant fall
into the second category, the new trial might well look very different
from the first one, as long as the court reconsidered the issues and han-
dled them somewhat differently. And to the extent that the errors
raised on appeal constitute a mixture of both types, the same conclu-
sions would likely follow. In neither situation would a remand likely
be futile.
But would the trial court see any reason to rule differently on these
discretionary issues at the second trial? Arguably, it would. Certainly,
by reversing, the appellate court will have sent a message to the trial
court that even though no agreement could be reached as to the precise
ground of the error, the first trial was, as a whole, defective. The mere
fact of reversal makes clear that substantial error was committed. This
might well create an incentive on the part of an alert trial court to han-
dle the second trial somewhat differently, and its discretion with regard
to a broad category of purported errors will make this task a feasible
one.
252
Therefore, even when an appellate court cannot muster majority
agreement on the particular error committed below, a reversal and re-
250. 438 N.E.2d at 714.
251. Recall that defendant claimed that the trial court erred in not adhering to a statutory
procedure in making its finding that he was competent to stand trial, and that one justice
agreed with him on appeal. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
252. It is also possible that the parties, and particularly the prosecution in a criminal case,
will alter their manner of presenting their case. The desire in doing so would be the same as
that of the trial court: to avoid raising at least some of the same issues which formed the
basis of the appeal and the overturning of the judgment. However, proper representation of
the interests of the respective clients will often make significant change unlikely.
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mand for new trial will generally be a viable alternative. The correct-
ness function can be appropriately performed.
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the due process violation attendant upon an appel-
late court's refusal to render a disposition consistent with the majority
vote will not admit of easy solution in some cases. Each of the options
discussed in the previous section provides a means by which the due
process violation can be overcome, but itself poses other problems of
varying levels of seriousness. However, it has not been the purpose of
this article to explore fully the means by which appellate courts can
remedy the problem once it has occurred. Rather, the article has had
two primary purposes: first, to demonstrate the importance of the "cor-
rectness" function of appellate review; and second, to indicate the seri-
ousness of at least one way in which courts sometimes do not serve that
function.
The relatively rare occurrences of appellate dispositions similar to
those in Bryan and Peoples Bank should not lead one to believe that
the problem raised by those cases is not an urgent one. We are living in
a society which poses increasingly complex and controversial issues of
social policy and justice, and we require our appellate courts to become
embroiled in these debates as they are faced with the decision of indi-
vidual cases. The very complexity and controversial nature of the is-
sues themselves have led to ever-widening divisions in the views of our
appellate judges, and as those divisions become more and more appar-
ent, great attention is focused on the courts' role of offering leadership
and guidance to others who must both act in the society and create and
enforce rules which apply to all of its members.
But through all of this, appellate courts must still decide the partic-
ular cases which come before them. They cannot function as legisla-
tures unable to reach majority agreement as to the passage of a
particular piece of legislation. Faced with divisive issues, legislatures
can typically avoid the question by simply not acting at all. 53 Courts,
however, cannot do this. They can, of course, render decisions which
are carefully circumscribed so as to have application to only a narrow
range of problems, but they should not decide cases without regard to
the interests of individuals before them. If courts are only permitted to
253. As to some matters, of course, legislatures must also take some affirmative action.
An example would be the passage of budget measures.
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act in the face of actual controversies, 254 they must engage in their de-
liberations without losing sight of the very source which gives them the
power to act in the first place.
254. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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